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Journalism scholarship has studied how risk is portrayed in newspapers through studies such as 
moral panic and Social Amplification of risk. What has been explored to a lesser extent however, is 
the ideological focus of risk. In modern society, risk is endogenous, and as such, controlling the 
narrative of risk is an important ideological consideration. This paper explores the role that 
journalists hold in the communication of risk as theorised by Ulrich Beck’s Risk society, whilst also 
interrogating the role of risk management in professionalised discourses. In analysing newspaper 
output across major UK newspapers during and after the Brexit referendum – an event filled with 
uncertainty and risk – a critical understanding of the role of journalists and other professionals is 
identified. The difference between how tabloid and broadsheet journalists interact with risk 
discourse is explored to show how risk discourse be subverted through the language of opportunity, 
only for the professionalized techniques of risk management to quickly reassert control of the 
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Journalism and communication scholars have undertaken a great deal of research into the logic of 
risk within journalism; principally through the study of public-health campaigns, coverage of natural 
disasters, and impending ecological disaster. Critics have noted the hyperbolic and escalating 
tendencies of newspaper’s reaction to risk from these natural disasters in theories such as Moral 
Panic and Social Amplification of Risk. The language of risk however, is a codified and technocratic 
discourse – inherently tied up with probability and with capitalism. Why then have studies of 
journalism retreated from analysing discourses of risk in economic and political journalism, when the 
effects are so clear in reportage of health-awareness and natural disasters?  
Ulrich Beck has argued that we are now living in a Risk Society (Beck, 1992). That is a society that has 
overcome most of the obstacles that man contended with in the natural world, only to be replaced 
by the unintended consequences of our own decisions. In this paper, this is what is referred to as 
reflexive risk. In response to this policy makers, unable to comprehend the severity and 
interconnectedness of these differing crises, have turned instead to a model of governance based 
upon risk mitigation (Bierfeld, Ulf, 2001). Beck's original thesis took, as its prima facie example of 
reflexive man-made risk, the impending disasters of climate change, radiation, industrial disasters, 
and the diminishing availability of resources, arguing that complexity and severity of these risks 
meant that they could now effect anyone regardless of socio-economic background.  
Journalism and communication scholars have undertaken a great deal of research into how the 
media has amplified the perception of man-made natural disasters such as those mentioned above 
(Cottle, 2011; Ohman, 2016; Clapton & Hameiri, 2012). These have ranged from analyses of public 
health awareness campaigns by the Glasgow Media Group (Miller & Williams, 1995), theories of 
moral panic, Social Amplification of Risk (Howarth, 2012), to Foucauldian analyses of the creation of 
discourses of risk management and notions of governmentality. This research is valuable because 
journalism plays a very important role in forging how risks are perceived through. Within Beck’s risk 
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society, risks are inevitable and acknowledged as such. It is the management of perceptions of risk 
that becomes of vital importance. What these theories do miss though is the fact that the language 
of risk is also the language of economics (Mairal, 2011, p.69). It is inherently tied up in to the 
language of business and probability. One of the most instructive traits of risk management 
discourse is that of its infinite replicability, through ascription of impending disaster to an infinitude 
of unknown unknowns (Hardy & Maguire, 2016). This makes it a powerfully coercive tool for 
business leaders, but also for policy makers. There is always another danger around the corner; 
there is always a consequence to our actions, and this makes for fertile ground for reporting in a 24-
hour news cycle. The perception of risk can therefore be a useful tool and journalists play a large 
role in its management. 
During the Brexit referendum, the Remain campaign was labelled Project Fear due to the monotony 
of their ascriptions of apocalyptic disasters to the UK economy following a leave vote. In actuality, 
campaigners, and experts, were caught in the language of their profession, the language of citizens 
within a capitalist society; the dominant discourse of risk. Risk modelling applies data from the past 
to forecast events in the future. Yet risk modelling time and time again has failed to recognise 
impending disaster in financial markets. This is a problem inherent in our understanding of risk first 
noted by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial crash (Taleb, 2008).  Namely, 
that the creation of models to mitigate risk using data from the past obscures us from an 
understanding of what the next outlier event could be. Risk discourse extrapolates from the past, to 
predict and coerce the future, yet events do not necessarily follow the trajectory of the past. Events 
such as Brexit, Donald Trump's election, and the 2008 Financial crash have damaged the reputation 
of experts and of public choice theory (Schneider, F. 2009), whilst the credibility of journalists has 
been similarly tarnished through association, or through their perceived lack of scrutiny (Schechter, 
D. 2009). Simply put, the complexities of today's problems, combined with the increasing time 
pressures placed upon journalists in the 24-hour news cycle, has led to a reliance on the opinion of 
experts, unaware of their own position within the dominant discourse of risk. 
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This paper intends to understand how the discourse of risk management can be used to shape the 
horizons of political journalism through an understanding of how newspapers in the UK reported on 
the perception of risk in the Brexit referendum. Facing a crisis of confidence in their own expertise; 
the way journalists engage with the risk discourse of public policy and ‘lay vs experts’ debate will 
shed light upon the difficulties facing journalism at this time. Criticism of the debate surrounding the 
Brexit referendum has been rife; ranging from dishonesty amongst politicians, to inaccurate 
reporting or ill-considered balancing of opinions from the BBC (Guardian, Bennet, 2016). Whilst 
much of this has a degree of truth, the larger issue may be that the language and discourse mediated 
and published by newspapers simply does not speak to a section of society that has not reaped the 
benefits of this increasingly interconnected and highly technical society. The common narrative of 
the campaign has been that disillusioned white working-class voters voted with their hearts for the 
leave campaign’s promise to ‘take back control’, rather than following the technocratic argument of 
the remain campaigns warnings against economic instability (Guardian, Cooper, 2016).  
 In short, it seems as if there is a disconnect between the political and economic technocratic 
discourse of politicians, businessmen and journalists, the lived experience of a significant proportion 
of the UK public and how this is reported across newspapers in the UK with different target 
readerships. How then, has the discourse of risk impacted upon relationships of players within the 
social structures that create Beck’s Risk Society. How does it signify power relations on the one hand, 
whilst potentially alienating those outside the discourse? By repositioning the study of media 
depictions of risk away from exogenous events, such as natural disasters, towards economically or 
politically determined endogenous risk, this paper will look at the position journalism takes within 
the discourse as its attempts to conciliate the views of lay and experts, and how journalism plays a 
vital role in managing the perception of risk within the discourse. 
By studying how the Brexit debate was portrayed in the weeks before and after the election, this 
paper seeks to shed some light upon how and why the decision ended up as a leave vote, and to 
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explain possible reasons for this blindsiding amongst British elites. Journalism’s position as 
mouthpiece and interrogator to elites places the practice at the heart of the relationship between 
government and the voting public (Hanitzsch, T. 2007). More importantly though is the role that 
journalism plays in the representation of risk within the discourse of risk. In analysing the reactions 
of 5 daily UK newspapers during and after the campaign we will seek to analyse how their 
internalisation - or rejection - of the dialogue of risks helps characterise their positions towards 
Brexit, and the role that journalism plays within the discourse. 
To begin with, this paper will look at what exactly is meant by risk in the sense of games and in 
mathematics and how this language has been applied to professions such as risk managers, and the 
risk discourse that stems from their profession. The links between this and economics will then be 
explored before looking at the history of the relationship between the EU and UK, and the way that 
the EU has been portrayed across member states through each state’s journalism. In so doing the 
links between risk and economics can be seen to shift within public perceptions through journalism 
and the management of the perception of risk. Following this, this paper will look at what exactly 
constitutes globalisation, what the ramification for journalism of globalisation are, before exploring 
how the reflexive risks of Becks’ risk society are created by economics and political choices, rather 
than exogenous risks such as natural disasters. 
Risk discourse will then be examined through professionalisation and cosmopolitanism to see how 
globalisation and risk discourse are inherent to each other. Journalism as a profession will be 
examined, and the impact of globalisation on prevalent media trends will be analysed to understand 
the impact of professionalisation and consumption on journalism. Then, this paper will look at the 
studies already undertaken on risk society in journalism to look for insight into how to critically 
examine the journalism of the Brexit debate. This will inform the key questions to be answered in 
our later analysis. By analysing the Brexit debate as an example of the management of risk 
perception, both through participants within the discourse, and in particular through journalism, this 
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paper hopes to join the dots in terms of how economics and professionalisation inform Beck’s risk 








What is risk? 
Risk is a highly technical term inherently bound up with notions of probability and with capitalism. 
Mairal Gaspar traces a narrative history of risk in the media, starting with a change in the meaning of 
the word in the 1500s to reflect the inclusion of mathematically deduced chances of accidents 
befalling transoceanic merchants for insurance purposes (Mairal, 2011). The word is distinctly 
capitalist. Gaspar then traces the origins of journalistic forms of risk narrative, starting with the 
Lisbon earthquake and moving through to Daniel Defoe's forewarning of a recurrence of the plague. 
One of the key features of this narrative form is the inclusion of the opinion of experts - i.e. great 
catastrophes were no longer seen as acts of God, they were something which could be acted upon 
to minimise the effects of the catastrophe. Opinions of experts are shaped primarily through the 
historical data available to them. For analysing the likelihood of natural disasters occurring again this 
can prove very useful but when it comes to the self-inflicted disasters of the risk society, such as 
economic collapse, the opinions of experts lose impact. This is because unlike natural disasters, 
which given the same circumstances will produce the same result, which is measurable through 
physics or chemistry, man-made disasters are often multifaceted and difficult to attribute a single 
cause too. These natural disasters are reflexive and endogenous, and so are the solutions to the 
disasters. In gathering data on past experience, we lessen the chance of such an event happening 
again and learn how best to tackle it if it does, thus shutting down, or seriously minimising, the 
potential of a reoccurrence. In so doing, we create a false impression of surety and discount the 
chance of such an event happening in such a disastrous manner again. We see here the two faces of 
risk. There is a chance that a venture will be successful, whilst simultaneously admitting to the 
chance that the venture will not be successful. 




Figure 1 - Bell Curve Model of Distribution 
This bell graph allows you to make educated guesses about the likelihood of any occurrence within 
an evenly distributed scale. Take a physical attribute such as weight for instance. If you weighed 
1000 randomly selected people roughly 60% of them would fall within one standard deviation of the 
mean.  Those at the far end of either scale would be outliers, but they would not be that different 
from the mean. If the mean is 80kg, then the low end may be 40kg, whilst the high may be 120kg. 
Even if there is an extreme outlier in your sample, the distribution will still closely match the 
distribution shown in the graph, and that outlier will only represent a tiny fraction of the total. This is 
what is implied by Newtonian risk. it is easily predictable with a great deal of replicability. A non-





Figure 2 - Income distribution in the UK as an example of fat-tailed distribution 
The difference between these two scales is that the long tail of income distribution lies far outside 
one or two standard deviations from the mean. If we were to collect another sample of 1000 people, 
but include the wealthiest person on earth, their total wealth would skew the mean so dramatically 
as to make the calculation of risk or probability in the sample entirely dependent upon them. These 
kinds of positive skews are seen all over the reflexive problems of second modernity, yet because of 
a preference to analyse the evenly distributed bell curve we often ignore what Nassim Nicholas 
Taleb has called, the Black swan event. That is an event that lies so far outside of the normal 
distribution but has a disproportionate effect on the model. In Taleb’s words, the black swan event 
“occurs relative to your experience” (Taleb, 2007). A turkey may be fed every day for a thousand 
days and expect to be fed on 1001st, only to be led to the slaughterhouse. The preceding 1000 days 
created experience and set the frames of reference that would fit inside a normal gaussian 
distribution, the fat tailed events of 1001st day had a much greater effect than any of the preceding 
1000 days. This above graph is an example of that in as much as there is no indication on it as the 
extreme minority of people taking home many multiples of £140,000 a year. They are a frighteningly 
small number, but their importance to the system is disproportionate to all others in the sample. In 
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analysing risks encountered in the past we create predictive models that operate like the original 
bell-curve graph, but in so doing obscure the possibility of events not counted for within the model 
from happening, thus exposing ourselves to the Black Swan event, or fat-tailed distribution. 
The phenomena of fat-tail risk in economic affairs allows for a de-politicisation of our economic 
system through sheer virtue of our not being able to understand accurately the probability of such 
an event. Nordhaus has termed this as “tail irrelevance” (Nordhuas, 2010, pp.201) as although these 
events have an inordinate effect on man-made systems, the sheer unlikelihood of them occurring 
precludes discussion due to the technical understanding necessary to politicise them – particularly 
when these fat tail events are often symptoms of the design of economics systems, such as Kalecki’s 
understanding of how Keynesianism would generate its own downfall. Disrupting events appear to 
come from nowhere and causation is only ascribed after the event. This is a fallacy of narrative and 
one that journalists too easily succumb to. The sheer randomness of events in reflexive second 
modernity does not appeal to our sense of narrative and longing for logic of history. Admission of 
unawareness, in journalists, as in experts, is an avenue of attack and a means through which to 
lessen their standing. Fat-tail risks are reflective of second modernity because of their extremely low 
chance, but disproportionate effect. The disproportionate weight that media puts upon certain 
incidents allows policy to be targeted upon certain black swan events, such as terrorism for instance, 
yet simultaneously precluded from targeting black swan events such as the credit explosion which 
preceded the 2008 financial crash. The manufacturing of unawareness is crucial in the discourse 
between lay and expert. Films such as J.C. Chandor’s Margin Call (2011), or Adam McKay’s The Big 
Short (2015) illustrate this perfectly when on the brink of the crises they reveal that many economic 
players knew what was about to happen but didn’t want to be the first people to admit it, because 
only then would it become reality. Facilitating unawareness of risk was key to protecting their 
interests, and to keep the economic system running as usual.   
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Risk in games 
All games contain risk, and as the French sociologist Roger Caillois noted, there are two types of risk-
based games in existence. There are games he termed Alea, whose outcome occurs completely 
dependently of the player's interactions. Games such as the lottery or roulette fall into this category. 
Then there are games called Agon, with set rules applied systematically wherein the player's skill 
directly impacts upon the result of the game, such as snooker or football. He argued that society is 
portrayed as a game of Agon where every player has a chance proportionate to their ability. Yet as 
we can see from the logic of risk, situations where one is shielded from the ability to lose too much 
from a single risk allow for much greater risks to be taken, with the negative effects effecting others, 
rather than yourself. If society is unfairly Agonistic, then why not level the playing field? Indeed, this 
may well explain the enduring appeal of games of Alea, due to their ability to act as a great leveller. 
In some ways, it is tempting to view the Brexit referendum as a spin on a roulette table in frustration 
against a society that was no longer perceived as Agonistic - an attempt by those locked out of 
progress to level the playing field somewhat. Martin Young has argued that the perception of society 
as unfairly Agonistic explains the continued desire for games such as the lottery which present a 
chance for anyone to beat these odds (Young, 2010). Indeed, Young argues, Aleaic games may well 
be a defining feature of the capitalist state "more concerned with the production of desire than with 
the consumption of individual commodities (pp.1483)." Whilst risk can often be seen as simple 
dichotomy between reward and failure, an understanding of how losing can be different, the 
difference between bell-curve and fat tail risk distribution, and the difference between how the rules 
of risk can be perceived, add new avenues for understanding.  
 
How has risk discourse infiltrated public policy? 
Despite the vanishingly small chances of accurately predicting the majority of fat-tailed risks, risk 
management is a burgeoning profession. The management of risk can take several forms.  
Preventative health and safety strategies, using past incidents, and hard data to create new 
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processes and procedures to reduce exposure to risk are employed in every industry. Risk managers 
in financial industries use their knowledge to hedge bets against the likelihood of any constituent 
part of their portfolio collapsing. Some risk managers, such as those concerned with Health & Safety 
focus on the elimination of risk from within the bell curve since the environments they work in are 
contained and can be analysed in detail to mitigate exposure to everyday risk. Others focus on the 
much harder to predict, but disproportionately harmful, instances of fat-tailed risk. For risk 
managers on either side of the spectrum, bodies of work have been written up, general practice 
standardised, and processes systematised. This process of codified collaboration across the 
profession creates discourse of risk in the Foucauldian sense of a dominant discourse (Jasanoff, 
1998, pp.92). Texts and experience draw from, and reinforce, one another. New entrants into the 
profession of risk management are immersed into this pool of knowledge and quickly inducted into 
its thinking. Outsiders wishing to critique the claims of the discourse find criticism falls on deaf ears 
due to their position of being outside the discourse. In many ways, dominant discourses are very 
similar to older concepts of ideology but replaces the ideas of class consciousness to the more 
singularly located collection of ideas and best practice located within a profession. As Norman 
Fairclough and Lilie Chouliaraki describe professional discourse earlier as “one moment in a social 
practice which is dialectically linked to others, with an orientation to a practical intervention aimed 
at changing (this bit of) the world” (Fairclough & Chouliaraki,  1999). Risk managers apply their trade 
to a huge variety of other endeavours, and in so doing seek to impact directly upon the undertaking 
that they are tied too. The weight of the discourse of risk management that they draw upon lends 
them the clout needed to achieve these changes. The Foucauldian "regime of truth" ensures that 
their point of view cannot be challenged (Foucault, 1977).   
A dominant discourse of risk management has the effect of doubling down on the insurance of 
stability. The discourse itself is difficult to manage, whilst risk management comes with an 
underlying assumption that what is currently operating is worth continuing and preserving. It also 
serves to couch our understanding of this maintenance in technicalities, statistics, learned scholars, 
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and the weight of evidence of prior instances in what Taleb described as the central problem of 
induction (pp.41). Risk management then becomes a very powerful tool for preserving interests, for 
maintaining power-relationships, and for maintaining the status quo beyond adapting processes to 
ensure the continued stability of the system. This logic of maintenance of stability find its voice in 
Margaret Thatcher's famous rebuttal to alternatives of neoliberalism; "there is no alternative" or 
TINA. TINA signifies total assurance in the correctness of the current path and certitude in the fallacy 
of the opposition's arguments. The dominant discourse of neoliberalism, buttressed by the discourse 
of risk management to ensure the continuation of one another. In some respects, aspects of 
globalisation – particularly that of the free movement of capital – have forced politicians into a more 
managerial mindset; aware of their diminished capacity of change in a global world, maintenance of 
what has been achieved stands as a certain objective. As T Klikauer writes “Managerialists pretend 
to have advanced knowledge and know-how deemed necessary to the efficient running of 
organizations” (Klikauer, 2015, pp.1105), yet as we have seen with fat-tailed risks above, many of the 
greatest dangers to the system cannot be anticipated, due to their endogenous nature. The 2008 
financial crash was a prime example of this. Whilst many causal nodes have been identified it is very 
unlikely that there will ever be a definitive answer to what caused it, and the representation of risk 
for any one of these causes can be utilised by any number of parties to put weight to their own 
interpretation of what must be changed when moving forward. Anti-capitalists will blame banker's 
hubris, investment bankers may blame state intervention or regulation. Some economists will blame 
Collateralised debt obligations, whilst others will blame the over-indebtedness of banks customers. 
Each factor plays host to a systemic risk, but it is in the representation of risk when no genuine 
wholly correct answer can be arrived at due to the reflexive nature of the crisis, that debates are 




What do we misunderstand about risk: 
Beyond the misunderstanding of fat-tailed endogenous risk to reflexive modernity, there are several 
other factors that are often misunderstood about risk. If a gambler were to bet £100 winning £100 is 
as good as losing £100 is bad. This is only the case if the £100 can be lost without causing any 
significant disruption to the gambler's ability to continue playing to recoup his loss. If the gambler 
only has £100 then the loss of his stake means the loss of his game. If that is the last £100 in his bank 
account, then the consequences of this loss far outweigh the potential gains from winning another 
£100. Extrapolate this reasoning to a societal level and we can see that there are degrees of risk that 
are acceptable and those that are not. The loss of an individual to society is, in a strictly economic, 
non-moral sense, easily managed. The loss of a town, more troublesome, The loss of a major city or 
industry – potentially catastrophic for the whole. Individual assumption of risk can only be tragic to 
the individual and to a surrounding community of friends and relatives. This is damaging to the 
individual, but not really to society. Organisations that can cause systemic risk to the whole of 
society however, very rarely pass the devastating effects on to the individuals who assumed that 
level of risk. For instance, when a bank goes down due to dodgy trades or overleveraging, the 
traders responsible may lose their job but the effects that they have meted out on to the whole of 
society will not be proportionately placed upon them. There is less of a personal stake in decisions 
within organisations that due to their size, or importance, can cause systemic risk. Larger 
organisations can therefore take larger risks, shielded by their size and lack of accountability when 
compared to smaller organisations or individuals. This size also lends these organisations an 
important position within the dominant discourse and encourages others to view their actions as the 
correct choice, or indeed their puts within markets should they be players within the financial 
sphere. 
We see that risk-taking favours larger organisations who are also best placed to be seen as leaders 
within the dominant discourse of risk management thus perpetuating their decisions and ability to 
profit from the existing status quo. This maintenance is tied to another interesting property of risk in 
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reflexive humanity. Risk can come from anywhere. We cannot, as we have seen above, always 
anticipate the source of risk, and each new piece of understanding offers new avenues for exposure 
to risk. This means that risk professionals can proffer their services to hedge against a potentially 
infinite series of unknown unknown's; theirs is a profession without limits as to its marketability, and 
just as capitalism can monetise anything that it comes into contact with, risk can be identified as 
coming from every angle in reflexive humanity, and the dominant discourse can apply its knowledge 
to this new threat. It is also against the interest of risk management to truly protect against risk, as 
without risk there would no longer be a risk management industry (Krahman, 2011). Once again the 
perception of risk becomes the most important thing, for the profession, for the stability of the 
system, and ultimately for the depoliticization of economics. 
 
Why does the risk society create disenfranchisement? 
Francis Fukuyama famously called the triumph of capitalism over communism "the end of history 
(1993)." By this he meant that ideological struggle over how best to mediate human social affairs 
was over. Capitalism had won. What now matters most is the managing of risk to alleviate the 
immediate harm done by markets, whilst maintaining the markets forward trajectory as engineers of 
social change. Before Fukuyama, James Burnham had conceived of this possibility in his book The 
Managerial Society (1962). Burnham’s keen insight was that during the second stage of modernity, 
the real engineers of social change were not the bourgeois factory owners, but the technocracies of 
modern welfare economies and the managerial class that had arisen to control them. The real 
means of production now lie in the coordination of entire nations of workers within a market system 
and so, with growth being the only indicator of improvement within a capitalist society, politicians 
and civil servants have adopted these business strategies. As Burnham writes, “the managers tend to 
think of solving social and political issues as they co-ordinate and organise the cultural process of 
production. (Burnham, p.91)” Politics and economics are always intimately tied, but in our current 
state the theorems and machinations of politics are those of business. Gone are the grand political 
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ideas of the past, replaced instead with space for individual expression within a depoliticised world 
run by managerial technocrats intent on ensuring stability of the system. A great deal of the apathy 
of our modern age can be tied to this blend of economics, politics and risk management into a 
dominant discourse. As Mark Blyth writes: 
"Ten years out from the crisis, what we see today is a political reaction to the reversal of power 
between creditors and debtors that was produced by the tightly coupled institutions that lay at the 
heart of Regime II. (Blyth & Matthjis,2017) " 
By Regime II, he refers to the political institutions set up in the 1970s aimed at maintaining price 
stability rather than the full employment of Regime I (Keynesianism). We are in the midst of a 
creditor debtor standoff, wherein there is no inflation to erase debts and the working poor can no 
longer service these debts thanks to their stagnating wages and an increased reliance of consumer 
credit (Bank of England, 2018). No alternative to current macroeconomic policy is countenanced, 
and the discourse risk management acts as gatekeeper to prevent economic debate becoming 
political debate. In this manner the risk society is one of disenfranchisement for a proportion of 
society who do not reap the benefits from globalisation and who are allowed no scope for 




Risk Discourse is economic discourse 
Risk forms a dominant discourse because it not only describes things – it does things. It can be used 
to achieve maintenance of a set of circumstances. It can shape our perceptions through the creation 
and application of models based on historical precedent or utilise the sheer weight of pre—existing 
documentation to create a position of authority for the practitioner of risk-management. The 
importance of this discourse cannot be overestimated as, as Hardy and Maguire put it: 
"This knowledge is assumed to be authoritative, unbiased, reliable, and complete, thereby producing 
confidence in its ability to accurately identify the likelihood and magnitude of negative events. In 
contrast, lay knowledge is framed as politicized and irrational. (Hardy & Maguire, 2016)" 
It forms part of the Foucauldian "regime of truth (Foucault, 1980, p.131)" with the benefit of helping 
to maintain the perception of risk in the risk society. Risk discourses further naturalises economic 
discourse by only showing the problems that could befall a change of course, rather than imagining 
the changes that could improve the present. As Hardy and Maguire note, "the status of risk 
knowledge produced in real time is therefore only ever provisional; it can only be legitimised after 
the fact through the retrospective organising of risk (2016, pp. 99)" - organising that is undertaken 
by actors within the dominant discourse of risk. In this way the discourse is used to shield errant 
judgments in the moment by describing the error of that moment as outside of the discourse. Once 
the risk that happened has been deliberated over, it can then be used as another source of 
knowledge within the discourse. We have here, a perfect analogy for the way in which the leave and 
remain sides in Brexit have been portrayed. On the remain side – the weight of inductive evidence 
backed by authoritative experts. Whilst on the leave side, a dismissal of these same experts which 
has been framed as politicised and irrational. 
Much the same thing has been said about economic discourse since 2008. Despite most economists 
not being aware of an impending crisis, very few have lost reputation (at least from an academic 
point of view). Mike Berry, studied the UK press during the deficit debates and proved that many 
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commentators chosen to respond to the crises were either employees of major financial institutions, 
free-market think-tank members, or explicitly neoliberal politicians (Berry, 2012). Many of them 
were the same people who had not understood the dangers of over financialisaton pre-2008 and 
virtually no counter-arguments were put forward against the government's pursuit of quantitative 
easing. Framing in risk and economic debates is often led by the dominant discourse, seeking to 
maintain stability and maintain its course. In Kahneman and Tversky's study of risk choice framing, 
participants that responded to questions that were framed in a risk averse manner were analysed to 
be risk averse. These same participants responding to questions framed in terms of opportunity 
were deemed to be risk-seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Only those with authority within the 
dominant discourse are seen as fit to comment upon the discourse. Couple this with the discourses 
desire to maintain itself and increase stability, then risks (which could also be opportunities) to the 
status quo are framed as risks, perpetuating the existing discourse.  
This discussion on the importance of risk and how risk discourse is linked to economics is of 
importance in understanding Britain’s relationship to the European Union and how this relationship 
came under examination during the 2016 referendum on leaving the EU. Much of the commentary 
on the remain side was dry and technocratic, couched in the language of risk, and backed up by the 
weight of expert opinion. In contrast, the emotive language of the leave campaign relied less on 
expert opinion, and more on appeals to the heart. To understand why this was the case, it is 
important to dig into the history of the relationship between the UK and the European Union, and 






Britain’s Relationship with the EU 
History of Britain’s relationship with EU 
The UK press has had a long and winding relationship with the idea of the European integration. 
Post-1945, the press was more focused on domestic issues such as the rebuilding of state and the 
end of Empire, than developments in a proto-European community. It wasn’t until 1955 that press in 
the UK began to give serious coverage to discussion of a European community. During this time, 
then UK tried to set up a ‘free trade’ area rather than a common market as espoused by Jean 
Monnet and other proto-federalists. In 1958, discussions of this with other European members were 
ultimately blocked by De Gaulle. In response, UK and 7 other European nations set up EFTA without 
including France and Germany. The press in the UK held wildly different views; the Observer was 
Federalist, and the leading paper of the time, the Daily Express, was commonwealth orientated. No 
papers gave the subject a great amount of attention until the collapse of the UKs negotiations on a 
free trade area in 1958 (Wilkes, G., Wring, D. 2019) 
The Times had a front page entitle ‘France the wrecker’ after the collapse of the initial Free Trade 
area negotiations. After this collapse of these negotiations, the newspapers started to more 
seriously interrogate the idea of European integration and the merits of joining the ECSC. Over the 
next few years there is only tangential evidence of the effect of the British press on government 
policy and public opinion. As Wilkes, G., and Dominic Wring summarise, when government policy is 
most surefooted on European integration, the analysis in papers is at its most tentative, whilst when 
the papers are the most vocally supportive, government policy seems most conflicted. Macmillan 
made scant efforts to convince Lord Beaverbrook due to his open hostility towards Europe, and 
instead he and his government turned to public broadcasters and ministerial broadcasts to drum up 
support for Britain’s application to membership of the EEC.  
During the summer of 1962, the application to join the Common Market received greater attention 
for the UK press. Most papers were initially favourable, but as discussions continued enthusiasm 
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seemed to wane as the terms of the deal became more apparent. The Observer, Times and Guardian 
were against the deal, whilst The Mirror and the Herald remained cautiously supportive. De Gaulle’s 
veto of Britain’s entry to the common market however put an end to this coverage, with the Express 
running a  front page entitled ‘Hallelujah’. For the time being at least, it seemed that the issues of 
further European integration was at and end. It wasn’t until 1973 that Ted Heath’s conservative 
government finally gained entry to the common market, at which point many newspapers were 
broadly supportive of entry. Wilkes and Wring attribute this to the Conservative party’s 
revolutionary engagement of pubic relations tactics when liaising with the press. Anti-European 
sentiment was often maintained from a socialist standpoint, with concerns around protecting 
human-rights and an anti-competition mentality. As a result, much of the anti-integration 
campaigning was focused around winning the support of Trade unions, rather than of winning the 
support of the popular press.  
 
This broad support was not to last long, as in 1975, 2 years after formally joining the common 
market, Harold Wilson called a referendum on continued membership to confirm the decision 
against criticism from Eurosceptics on the right who saw membership as the beginning of a loss of 
sovereignty, and some left-wing elements of his party who saw the EU as too business friendly 
(Startin, 2015). This left-wing element of the Labour party would remain wary of the European Union 
until a high point in Michael Foot’s Labour party of the 1980s. Conservative support was initially 
limited to the benefits of tariff-free-trade and  standardisation of common practices and thus was 
not aligned with the vision for greater political unity that emerged from Brussels in the 1980s 
(Geddes, 2004). 
This underlying tension between Parliament and the growing European Union famously came to a 
head with Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech wherein she rallied against further political union by 
putting forward Britain’s position that the EU should remain as an enabler of relations between 
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sovereign states, rather than as a federal super state. Chris Gifford explores this tension by 
contrasting the European Union to the way Britain handles devolution within its own territories such 
as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Parliament is always sovereign but the flexible, and often 
not expressly codified way in which the various sub-parliaments work with one another. 
Parliament’s sovereignty is paramount in this example, so even if a flexible relation could be found 
between member states of the European union, further centralisation of power in Brussels would be 
fundamentally at odds with the parliamentary sovereignty. Gifford further explores this tension by 
looking at New Labour’s record of dealing with Europe. Although they were one of the more pro-
European governments in recent times, Europe was often treated as an aside and not allowed the 
airtime that Conservative governments of the past may have devoted to the debate. The UK 
struggles with the relationship between parliament and the EU when it comes to “integration that 
ties the UK into systems of rulemaking and application that cannot be aligned with executive power 
because they are concerned with holding executives to account, as in the example of the European 
Court of Justice” (Gifford, C, pp.326). 
To say the Britain is a reluctant partner though is only half the story. Liberalisation of Europe has 
often been spearheaded by British members of the EU allied with members from Germany and 
Holland. It could in fact be argued that Britain has been wanting to be a member of the European 
Union, but to want the European Union to be formed in its own image. There is a recognition – 
particularly in the philosophical backbone of the New Labour parliament, that in such a complicated 
world, governmental interdependence is crucial and often the only way to achieve widespread 
change (Giddens, 2004). The problem of marrying this with the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty has found itself expressed in the use of ‘red-lines’ when negotiating with Europe as this 
allows the executive within parliament an explicit expression of its own political agendas, against 




The 2008 crash and Britain’s relationship to the EU 
Public perception of the European Union has been changed by the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis in Europe; particularly in relation to the treatment of Greece in the Sovereign debt crisis that 
tested the bonds of European fraternity. The European project has been described as an elite led 
project and as such, it could well be conceived that the loss of faith in elites stemming from the 
financial crash also had a detrimental effect on British perceptions of the European Union. At a very 
material level it is interesting to note that prior to 2008 British newspapers had a total of six 
permanent correspondence based in Brussels. Post-2008, this number shrank to three as the 
realities of the economic squeeze took its toll on the newspaper industry. (Daddow, 2012, pp.1224). 
Pfietsch and Eschner undertook a comparative study of major newspapers within 5 core European 
nations and compared them to the amount of the European focused content within papers form the 
UK and Switzerland to gain an understanding of the level of European discourse across these nations 
between 2001 – 2002. The UK had the lowest percentage of editorials across all countries (19.6%, 
n=910) despite this time-period including the 2001 general election where European integration was 
a key topic for the Conservatives. The UK did, however, have the highest percentage of tabloid 
editorials covering EU integration (29.4%, n=197). Conversely UK broadsheets contained the lowest 
percentage (18%, n=511) of all countries compared. This suggest that the press climate in the UK 
was already quite different in its attitude towards Europe when compared to other European 
nations, including Switzerland, which although not a member state, contained a high proportion of 
quality newspaper editorials devoted to the issue of European integration. If the European union is 
to be thought of as an elite driven project – then the content of UK editorials suggests that elite level 
involvement in the European integration project does not receive the same level of attention in UK 
daily press, whereas tabloid papers take a much greater interest, suggesting perhaps a higher 
engagement with European issues (framed as versus the priorities of the nation) within tabloid 
readers (Pfietsch, Adam, Eschner, 2008). If tabloids were at the forefront of coverage of European 
issues in the UK, then an event such as the 2008 financial crisis could only serve to heighten the 
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criticism of elites that is so abundant in UK tabloids. Analysis of UK and Dutch newspapers by Tjitske 
Akkerman does however suggest that tabloid press often has a greater anti-populist bent and often 
serves to entrench elitist perspectives. (Akkerman, Tjitske, 2011). In the context of the UK it could be 
argued that much of the cause of this stems from what Daddow has termed the ‘Murdoch effect’. 
Since Rupert Murdoch’s takeover of The Sun in 1974 and The Times in 1981, courting the approval of 
his papers has been a keystone of any successful political campaign. His papers have supported the 
victor in every general election since Margaret Thatcher’s victory in 1979 and Daddow argues that 
the need for Murdoch’ support during Tony Blair’s premiership led to Europe being somewhat of a 
hushed issue. Although New Labour were arguably one of the most pro-European parties of modern 
times, European issues were often dealt with quietly so as not to draw attention to what had been 
such a contentious issue for Major’s governments. In 2004 when Tony Blair refused to hold a 
referendum on the 2004 treaty to establish of European constitution, Murdoch personally instructed 
editors at the News of the World to label the prime minster as a ‘traitor’ (Daddow, p.1229). From 
Murdoch’s perspective the European Union is threat to deregulated markets which his paper’s 
frequently champion (Mcknight, D. 2010). McKnight argues that such is the necessity of gaining the 
seal of approval from Murdoch’s papers to run a successful election campaign, that politicians have 
internalised his world view as a choice forced upon them by the ‘golden straitjacket’ of globalisation. 
Startin also emphasises the importance of the approval of Murdoch’s papers by highlighting a quote 
from John Major during the Leveson enquiry in which he said “[Murdoch] wished me to change our 
European policies. If we couldn’t change our European policies, then his papers could not and would 
not support the Conservative government” (pp.317). 
Since 2008 then, we have four key factors shaping the perception of the European union from both 
the political and from within print journalism. Firstly, the material loss of journalists whose job it was 
to follow European politics exclusively despite the UK having the lowest level of European discourse 
of any country studied. Secondly, the crash increased a sense of hostility towards elites. This was 
hampered by the wariness of politicians in the UK to champion European integration due to the 
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need to keep Murdoch’s papers onside. European matters were pressed on regardless increasing the 
impression that European integration was an elite-driven project thus bolstering anti-democratic 
viewpoints. Thirdly, the general level of hostility towards the European union within the newspapers 
of the UK seems to be higher than in other countries. Daddow puts it that ‘European affairs are 
reported by a sceptical media to a population among whom knowledge of the EU is the lowest of all 
member states’ (pp.1221). Lastly, the impact of the sovereign debt crisis in economic terms, and the 
later Syrian migrant crisis were easy fodder to a press that wanted to portray the EU as rife with 
internal issues. It is easy to see where the sense of the UKs detachment from the European Union 
grew in the years since 1975. 
Britain’s relationship with the European Union is but one facet of the way in which the world has 
changed since Britain’s first entrance into what was to become the European Union. In that time the 
world has changed rapidly, both in terms of technological advancement, and in terms of the new 
political and economic reality. To understand this, this paper will look at two key elements of this 
change. Namely, how globalisation has upended relationships between citizens and nation states 
since the 1970s, and how economic changes underpinning this have impacted upon political 
decisions and processes. To understand how risk discourse has grown to be of such importance, it is 
necessary to understand how exactly these political and economic realities come together with the 





Globalisation and Economics 
What is globalisation? 
Defining a multi-faceted phenomenon such as globalisation can prove troublesome without some 
initial generalisations. Broadly speaking there are several structural features embodied in politics, 
business and law that can, though tentatively, be labelled as manifestations of globalisation. These 
are features that are unique to globalisation and serve to distinguish its processes from the prior 
mercantilism of earlier eras (Nayyar, D. 2006). Firstly, they are structures that stem from 
supranational organisations, through negotiation and compromise, rather than through the imperial 
rule, or gunboat capitalism, of earlier mercantile systems, geared towards encouraging cross-border 
trading (Lewis, M; Baker, D. 2014). Secondly, advances in communication technology have increased 
the pace of growth astronomically, whilst computer systems have opened avenues for fine-margin 
growth through the quantification of the valuable data of industry. Technological advancement has 
been crucial to the growth of globalisation, but it has not been the sole driving force. Political 
processes have been set in motion to encourage these developments (Watson, M. Hay, C. 2003; 
Amoore, L., et. al., 1997; Hay, C. 2002). The third driving force has been key political decision which 
have shaped the financial architecture of a globalised world. In particular, the removal of restrictions 
on leverage and the liberalisation of financial markets necessary to grease the wheels of 
globalisation. This increased capacity for leverage, particularly that of the state (but also of private 
enterprise) increased the ability to take on risk at a much higher level. With the public sector, since it 
does not require the same profit motive, this has meant that much more speculative research can be 
undertaken. As Mariana Mazzucato has pointed out, almost every major technological advancement 
of the last century was created initially by the state (Mazzucato, 2013).  With the private sector, 
particularly financial services, it has created a new ocean of finance and debt through which returns 
can be generated. The politics of the past has shaped these features so in exploring them, a 
knowledge of how they came to be will prove useful in analysing their teleological emergence. 
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Cross Border Trade 
First and foremost, of these features of globalisation, has been the opening of cross border trade 
through reduction or eradication of tariffs. This allows for specialisation in different areas of the 
production process within key geographical areas. A trainer can be designed in the USA, the logistics 
for production and distribution be worked out in the Netherlands, the raw materials sourced in the 
Philippines, assembly conducted in China, then the product sold in retail outlets across the world. 
This specialisation allows for greater efficiency in uses of resources as is the aim of classical 
economics. Areas with access to more graduates or individuals with technical knowledge often find 
themselves home to multiple corporations with the same specialisms in a process known as 
“economic agglomeration” (Ottaviano, G., Puga, D. 1998, pp.707); Silicon Valley being a prime 
example of this. Transnational supply trains allow businesses access to cheaper materials, 
competitive labour costs, as well as less stringent regulatory environments with regards to labour 
laws or environmental protection standards (Chan, A. 2003). The profitability of these supply lines 
depends upon low tariffs, swift communication technology, and oil prices - features that are highly 
dependent upon the priorities of individual nation states. Some states actively court international 
manufacturing through the suppression of wages or exchange rates (Steinberg, 2015, p.93). Others 
aim for higher value sectors of the supply chain. 
Alongside more technical definitions of globalisation, stemming from economics and the business 
world, there has also been a cross-cultural pollination of ideas and cultural references. Many of 
these ideas spread from the standardisation of goods and commerce across the globe - particularly 
in the form of advertising. But divergence in cultures, ideas and interpretation, also fuels the 
emergence of new markets and products for global capital. Americanisation is not the result global 
capital as some have suggested (Schröter, 2008). Instead business and commerce adapt products 
and processes for their new markets to better take advantage of local tastes and understanding 




Global financial markets  
The second, and most pervasive feature of globalisation, has been a realignment of the rules of 
world finance and trade since the 1980s. Yanis Varoufakis has detailed in his books The Global 
Minotaur (Varoufakis, 2011), and the Weak Shall Suffer What They Must (Varoufakis, 2016), how the 
strategic coercion of the global financial system since the end of the post-war Bretton Woods system 
in the early seventies has created a new financial order. In the early 70s, when US economic export 
growth halted, American trade deficits grew until in 1985 it became a debtor nation (Eisner, R., Pieper, 
P.J., 1990, pp.11). Instead of accepting this diminution of global power, Paul Volker and a number of 
other economists in Washington decided to liberalise financial markets, removing restrictions of 
capital movement and lending that had existed since the Wall Street Crash. By doing so, they created 
the space for sophisticated financial instruments which accepted the surplus money of any nation, 
offering a return on investment, in exchange for the other nation’s continued financing of the US’s 
deficits (Dymski, G.A., 2011, p.119). This money was then invested across the world through mediums 
such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as US corporations. If a nation found itself in economic 
trouble, then a loan could be obtained from various International Financial Institutes (IFIs) in 
exchange for liberalisation of the country’s economy. This allowed growth to take place on a massive 
scale across the globe; growth which could then be sent to Wall Street to continue being recycled in 
much the same way as taxes are organised on a national level. Instead of investment in 
infrastructure and public services however, these tributes to - what Varoufakis has termed the - 
minotaur were used to speculate with. When this money was coupled with OPEC petro-dollars, a 
shadow economy of finance, tranches and collateralised debt obligations was created, worth many 
times what the money in the real-world economy was. As the graph below illustrates, the result was 
a ballooning in US national debt. The key to sustaining this lay in the US's ability to transform the risk 




Figure 3: Federal debt held by US Treasury. Available at https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-
econ/2000/november/national-debt-80s/ 
Without the Global Minotaur globalisation would not have been achievable on such a scale for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, individuals for the first time had access to cheap credit (Fernandez-
Corugedo, E., Muellbauer, J., 2006, pp.8).This is provided as a means of money creation to feed the 
minotaur as, since the financial liberalisation of the early 80s, banks were not subject to such strict 
conditions on lending and began to take advantage of fractional reserve banking (Ryan-Collins et al. 
2014). The IMF and the world bank have encouraged other countries to open themselves to financial 
liberalisation partly to extend the avenues for new accumulation of debt. 
 
‘Golden Straitjacket’ of Globalisation 
‘As your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, two things tend to happen: your economy grows 
and your politics shrinks (Friedman, 2000, pp. 105).’ This phrase from Friedman's The Lexus and the 
Olive Tree neatly captures how this process of standardisation through globalisation impacts upon 
the politics of the nation state. Countries that deregulate their financial markets curtail their ability 
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to deviate from the course wanted of them from global investors. As soon as an unstable or 
unwanted element comes in to play, capital flight can take place, quickly destroying any of the gains 
from financial liberalisation (Krugman, P., 2017). In effect, your politics are beholden to the market. 
In this way, the policies of the European Union in the sovereign debt crisis can be seen as 
symptomatic of many of the criticisms of globalisation and the Washington Consensus that 
underpinned much of the thinking of institutions such as the IMF until recently. The next section will 
link our understanding of the outcomes of globalisation, with the progenitors of these outcomes 
lying within the foundations of this new economic system. To do this, this paper will explain how the 
policies of Keynesianism, gave way to neoliberalism due to its inherent structural weaknesses and 
then examine how risk discourse began to infiltrate public policy because of this move to a 




Economics and Endogenous Risk 
Inflation of 1970s replaced with strict interest rate control 
Since the end of the 2008 Financial Crash the western world has seen unprecedentedly low levels of 
interest maintained by central banks to encourage borrowing and spending. Lower interest rates 
discourage saving as inflation eats away at the value of the money in saving. Following the liquidity 
crisis at the height of the crash, central banks utilised the one policy tool they still had direct control 
over – interest rates. These were lowered to encourage the money given to the financial system, in 
the form of quantitative easing, to be circulated into the real economy, rather than being stored by 
banks or used to pay off mounting debts in case another crisis of leverage should happen again. 
Independence was given to central banks in the west with one aim - to stop the inflation that had 
plagued the Keynesian economics of the 1970s and was a constant spectre on the mind of German 
authorities following the hyperinflation of the Wehrmacht years. Mario Draghi has said that 
"support from our monetary policy measures is still needed if inflation rates are to converge towards 
our objective with sufficient confidence and in a sustained manner (ECB, 2017)" indicating his remit. 
The Bank of England's own website has similar claims about their sole target being the pursuance of 
a steady rate of interest (BOE, 2007), and therefore price stability, since leaving the ERM in 1992. 
Part of the reason for this lies in classical economics thinking which is inherently mistrustful of the 
state and the inflation that can be wrought from increased public spending (particularly that of the 
Kings of Hume, Locke and Smith's time). This train of through comes from Hume to Smith, right 
down to Political Business cycle theory. A more pragmatic reason for this targeting of inflation was 
first posited by Michael Kalecki in his On the Political Aspects of Full Employment written in response 
to Keynes’s General Theory. Although broadly supportive of Keynes proposal of fiscal policy and 
giving preference to demand side economics he noted that: 
"...the maintenance of full employment [through taking on of state debt] would cause social and 
political changes which would give a new impetus to the opposition of the business leader. Indeed, 
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under a regime of permanent full employment, the 'sack' would cease to play its role as a 
disciplinary measure. (Kalecki, p. 3)" 
What Kalecki has noted here, is the economic reasons for political instability in an increasingly 
egalitarian society - such as existed in the 1970s across Europe. By increasing the bargaining position 
of workers – both politically and economically – the conditions were created for conflict between 
labour and capital; the policy of full employment created the economic conditions for its eventual 
downfall. 
Inflation caused by Keynesian economics did indeed give too much power to workers. This was not 
power in terms of class-consciousness though. It was power in terms of economics. Wages were 
high, assets cheap, and, most importantly, inflation was high meaning that debts accrued were 
written down in value due to inflation, whilst labour had the bargaining power, due to full 
employment, to raise wages in line with inflation. This meant that the value of debts and assets were 
slowly eroded and for the first time in the history of capitalism, inequality was decreasing. Picketty's 
formula - r>g (Picketty, 2013, pp.351), or the rate of return on assets always outstrips wage growth - 
was confounded in the thirty years following the second world war thanks to political choices of 
fiscal stimulus designed to rebuild infrastructure and the economic target of full employment, rather 
than price stability. Planned economies however had the flaw of not being able to react swiftly 
enough to changing global trends. With the end of America as a surplus nation, the banding together 
of OPEC countries to control oil prices, and lessening investment from industry, the creditor classes 
moved to secure a move towards monetarism, low inflation and restoration of the old adage of 
capitalism, namely, that the private sector operates with greater efficiency than does the public. As 
Mark Blyth notes. " we can talk about the shift from an MR of full employment to an MR of price 
stability occurring over the past 70 or so years.” (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017)" History then, has borne 




Depoliticization of Economics 
This foray into macroeconomics is important for the reason that economics has been depoliticised in 
recent years. Depoliticization is a technique for governance first noticed by Peter Burnham with 
reference to the Major and Blair governments (Burnham, 2001). It began as a means to ensure 
credibility in government economic targets, by attempting to distance these targets from direct 
political decision making. By creating an independent central bank, setting fiscal rules that maintain 
their credibility through the turmoil divergence would cause, devolving decision making to 
QUANGOs and expert opinion, governments sought to build consensus on their approach to the 
economy whilst simultaneously creating the illusion of distance between themselves and the policy 
decisions taken. This can also be seen as a symptom of Friedman's Golden Straitjacket, or through 
the lens of Mrs Thatcher's famous line that "there is no alternative." There are plenty of alternatives, 
but in the western world broad consensus on neoliberal, or Ordoliberal, economics - with varying 
shades of social democratic fixes to lessen the pain - has become the established norm through the 
establishment of economic rules for independent agents in charge of policy and monetary policy. 
Gone are the grand ideological differences of the past. Instead, politicians compete for 
interpretations of the same monetary policies enshrined in the depoliticization of economics 
through rules bound independent organisations in control of key policy areas (Burnham, P. 2014). 
What has changed is the unemployment is no longer seen as the risk once was. Now price stability is 
what must be maintained particularly when there is so much debt in the global economy. There has 
been a change in perception just as how private bank debt became public debt after the 2008 
Financial Crash. The problems of each economic order are caused by their priorities - they are 
reflexive. Price stability causes the build-up of debts, saddling the debtor class with more and more, 
whilst full employment leads to inflation diminishing the returns available to creditor classes. Both 
outcomes are reflexive, it is the choice in which risk is seen as the greater, and how this is portrayed 
to the public through the media, that plays a great role in determining understanding of policy. 
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Because of this the language of the risk society applies equally to economics, as it does to much of 
Beck’s work on radiation and climate change. 
 
Political decisions enabled globalisation 
Globalisation came to be possible because of the economic reaction to full employment. To break up 
the power of organised labour, restraining the power of trade unions was not sufficient. Low tariffs 
allow for the manufacturing of goods in areas where wage bills are lower. This has pros and cons. A 
report by the Overseas Development Institute noted that "textiles and clothing is a first step up the 
value-added industrialisation ladder beyond agriculture but before many other manufacturing and 
services activities (Keane & Velde, 2008)" indicating that outsourcing low wage areas such as textiles 
can be a great boon to developing countries. The headquarters wherein garments are designed and 
sold produce a far higher profit margin than the actual process of creating garments. Wages in areas 
that control these tasks are therefore higher. There are however, less of these jobs to go around, 
and the people in lower skilled jobs in western nations have to compete with competitors overseas, 




Figure 4: Global income distribution growth 1988 – 2008. Available from 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/global-income-distribution-fall-berlin-wall-great-recession. 
 
What we see is that wages up to around the seventieth percentile of global income distribution have 
raised significantly since 1988. This has lifted millions out of poverty and has led to a massive 
increase in wealth particularly in the Chinese and Indian middle classes. Beyond this point though we 
see that growth in the 75th to 99th percentile - broadly corresponding to the western lower and 
middle classes - has barely grown at all. This has been compensated for by cheaper goods and 
exceedingly cheap credit, thanks to the global minotaur. The wage growth from the 99th percentile 
however has been tremendous owing to their position as the creditor class. Note the presence of a 
fat-tailed distribution once again.  As mentioned above, the system of financialisaton that Western 
countries are committed to has led to an ever increasing need to create cheap money and cheap 
credit simply to maintain the flow of money in the global economy. Credit also acts as a useful 
coercive tool, allowing IFIs to demand further financial liberalisation of any country that finds itself in 
arrears, such as the PIIGS in the Eurozone.  
 
Political choices have economic consequences despite depoliticization 
All of this further fuels the 'global minotaur' allowing for constant access to cheap credit. British 
attitudes towards the European Union deteriorated in the wake of the harsh austerity measures 
meted out by the European Union on the PIIGS - particularly Greece. Evidence for this can be seen in 
NatCen British Social Attitudes Surveys whereby anti-EU responses reached a peak during the 
Eurozone crisis in 2011 (Kirby, 2016). Although other western countries committed to austerity 
politics after the 2008 financial crash, the circumstances of the Eurozone heightened the impact of 
these policies. The Eurozone is a political union, but not a fiscal one due to the lack of any 
redistributive tools between member states. Each country has a currency of equal value, but the 
wildly differing sizes of each economy creates great imbalances. As Mark Blyth has noted the Euro is 
"a gold standard in a democracy. (Blyth, 2013, p.77)" This in effect means that each country in the 
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Eurozone is pegged to Germany's economy. This means that in times of economic stress you cannot 
lower the value of your goods or exports as they are denominated in the same currency as far 
stronger economies. Your only options are to lower wages, cut public expenditure, or, most likely, 
both. Running a gold standard in a democracy proves very difficult in the long run for these very 
reasons - citizens get fed up with constant cuts. When the integrity of the Eurozone was at stake, 
along with the loans supplied to Eurozone periphery nations by central European banks, any means 
available were utilised to ensure price stability. As Joseph Steiglitz writes: 
 
"...finance ministries often use the IMF to enforce their perspectives, to adopt the institutional 
arrangements and regulatory macroeconomic frameworks that are in the interests of the 1 percent 
[creditor class]. Even Greece, to secure its 2011 bailout by the European union, was forced to pass 
laws affecting not only the budget but also the health sector, the rights of unions in collective 
bargaining, and the minimum wage. (Steiglitz, 2012, p.177)" 
 
The fact that the risk to Greece from this kind of austerity was so high, was largely ignored in favour 
of maintaining price stability in the Eurozone and in ensuring the stability of the European project for 
the sake of creditors. The experience of the Greeks signals the difficulties of running national politics 
alongside global economics. It would be difficult to imagine the consequences of allowing the 
financial system to collapse as could well have happened in 2008, but the way private debt has been 
shifted on to public account sheets by supranational organisations and national governments 
illustrates how crucial risk perception is to the endogenous effects of economics. The consequences 
of globalisation and the economic malaise western countries find themselves in were a key instigator 
of the Brexit vote. The sheer complexity of economic issues makes the job of financial and political 
journalists extremely difficult. Statistics make for uninteresting reading and the demands of constant 
newness placed upon modern media outlets create difficulties in presenting a historical 
macroeconomic viewpoint of the world. As illustrated by the graph above, there have been more 
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winners from globalisation across the world than losers in terms of wage growth. Each decision 
taken by national and supranational organisations has winners and losers; the problem is that 
statistics are dry and uninspiring. Anecdotes are what is remembered. As Stalin allegedly quipped, 
"one death is a tragedy, a million is a statistic." Economic decisions usually produce the truly tragic 
anecdotes years after the actual policy implementation. Consequences of austerity are still being 
unveiled. 
The liberalisation of financial markets necessary to continue the growth of the minotaur opens 
countries up to trade, immigration and capital movement. This brings with it the opportunities for 
the standard procedures of commerce to enter into new marketplaces and adapt their instruments 
to their new locality. Professional bodies begin to form a presence in once closed off nations and 
their internationally codified sets of procedures begin to become common practice in the new locale 
(Boussebaa, M., 2015; Netland, T.H., Alfnes, E., 2005). On a more human level, increased prosperity 
increases the opportunity of movement between locales, further increasing the integration of the 
local into global mechanisms of understanding and production. Liberalisation of markets ushers in 
the standardisation of production and analysis which encourages for the creation of entirely local 
points of view or products which can be easily translated or shipped to any other local within the 
global. This creates an easy relativism between societies based on an understanding of individuals 
operating within similar economic frameworks, professional practices and sharing similar 
understanding of one another as rational players acting in their own self-interest within a market 
(Jensen, 1994). This idea of a metropolitan mindset is of importance in understanding the role of 
newspapers in the Brexit campaign as journalists themselves, and as a profession, follow much of 
the same integration into a globalised system of standard and practices. The next section aims to 
explore how journalism as a profession, much like economics or politics – depoliticized through 
professionalisation – imbues actors within professional discourses with recourse to act and think 
within the discourse of their profession. 
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Globalisation and Professionalism 
What links professionalism and depoliticization to globalisation? 
As we have seen, globalisation is a process of centralisation as much as of liberalisation. The centres 
– more often than not – are cities which come with their own attendant outlook on life, yet 
cosmopolitanism can be seen as a cultural force homogenising the means of analysing difference 
(Giulianotti, R., Robertson, R., 2009, pp. 41). Cosmopolitan professionals use similar analytical and 
cultural methods for exploring vastly different cultures and conceptions. Hubs of cosmopolitanism 
such as New York, London and Paris, are often seen as distinct from the country they reside in. This 
is evident on a purely economic basis as the sharpest minds and most cutting-edge industries 
concentrate themselves in these locales due to the vicinity of other such industries, as well as the 
amenable nature of such cities, and their host countries, with their wealth of culture and facilities 
and systematically liberalised market places. This of course creates a continuous cycle – the oft 
noted ‘brain drain’ first noted by the Royal Society in a 1963 survey (Brian, et al. 2009), to these 
centres, further strengthening them and depleting the surrounding areas. Culturally the 
cosmopolitan adheres to no binding narrative or force, beyond that of their relative positions of 
prosperity, education, and proximity to outside influence that shares in the first two forces.  
The ubiquity of internet communication has also led to a centralisation of knowledge dissemination 
(Franklin & Murphy, 1998). The Newspaper industry is no exception to this. Much like the clustering 
of technology firms in Silicon Valley, media outlets have begun a process of centralisation - both in 
terms of business ownership - and of geographical location. Most UK regional newspapers are 
owned, written for, and edited from outside of the geographical area they represent (Ramsay & 
Moore, 2016, pp.6). This is made possible by the speed of internet communication, but made 
necessary by the decline in ad revenue felt by all newspapers as digital revenues fail to fill the void of 
traditional revenues from print publications (Sweney, 2015). This leaves newspaper professionals in 
a strange bind. Differences of opinion and representation are far easier to find than ever before due 
to the internet, yet the clustering of professionals - often in large metropolitan areas such as London 
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- can lead to confirmation bias, as the individuals living in a particular area such as cities, can often 
experience a very different lifestyle from the regions that they are trying to publish for. Simply put, if 
all of your friends and colleagues exhibit similar beliefs on the benefits of cosmopolitanism and 
globalisation, then you are likely to believe that this is the prevailing trend everywhere. Particular 
evidence of this has been found in analysis of the US media landscape whereby the clustering of 
journalists in east and west coast enclaves blinded them to the depth of feeling felt by many voters 
in the American heartlands (Schafer & Doherty, 2017). Similar evidence has been unearthed by the 
Carnegie Trust in the UK which has found that the vast majority of local newspapers in the UK are in 
fact aggregated by larger media outlets and often highly centralised, or have shut down in recent 
years (Carnegie Trust, 2016). The Trust argues that government should help to finance hyperlocal 
newspaper outlets to make up for this potential democratic deficit. This is indicative of one of the 
central problems of the concept of globalisation. Centralisation of ideation and content creation can 
deal with global themes - but then comes the difficulty of translating their applicability to the local 
market or face estrangement from said market. This seems somewhat problematic given the 
clustering like-minded individuals geographically and professionally. Manufacturers do so through 
changes in their products (think of the lemon added to coca cola sold in Arab countries) and so large 
media companies must tailor their content, dealing with global issues, to the territory in which they 
reside or market to. Some critics have argued that the centralisation of many aspects of newspaper 
production, such as printing, and back-line support indeed allow newspapers more resources to 
differentiate themselves and focus upon the particularities of their local audience (Sjøvaag, H., 2014, 
p. 519). Global news is made local in the same way as global industry is concentrated in to key 
pockets – cosmopolitanism is ‘glocalism’ as Ulrich Beck noted (Beck, 2006). By this he meant that 
global news is relayed to us often on an emotional, or very human level, as these analyses are far 
easier to understand in a cosmopolitan society than the complex motives and agendas of cultures 
very distinct from that of the cosmopolitan.  
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James Curran, in Media and Democracy (2011), has attempted to codify the different media 
professions and standards across the world by situating them in their historic and cultural setting. In 
short, he has noted that the political, cultural and industrial processes that created different media 
systems, also create a set of professionals who both are moulded by and perpetuate the style of 
industry through which they were educated. Their professionalism is part of a discourse. The UK, 
Curran has classified as a part of the ‘liberal model’ which ‘tend to have market-dominant media, 
professionally orientated journalists, fact-centred journalism guided by the norm of objectivity and 
autonomous systems of broadcast governance.’ Whereas in continental Europe, newspapers were 
often funded or aligned to political entities, the media within the Anglosphere has, from the start 
been market driven. The USA is taken as Curran’s idealised version of the liberal model, with its 
journalists remaining objective and reporting what is deemed to be of the public worth. Broadsheets 
in the UK appear to adhere to this idealised model, but the market stresses of the UKs national 
dailies markets has given rise to Tabloids which do not appear to fit in to the ideal liberal model. 
Tabloid papers are targeted towards lower seg demographics and as such do not attract the highest 
advertiser revenue, but this is made up for with high readerships which need to be incentivised and 
attracted. This has taken the form of often sensationalist reporting, and moral crusades (such as 
analysed by the Glasgow media group), often without the degree of factual basis which other 
journalists within the liberal model would feel professionally bound to require before reporting. 
Professional standards in Journalism, much like how economics has been depoliticised through the 
professionalisation of knowledge, has the effect of instilling certain ideological frames of reference 
through professional discourse, ultimately shaped by the historical and cultural milieu that has 





How does this tie in with the Risk Society? 
Beyond the obvious financial ramifications of globalisation, what does this demonstrate to us about 
the complexities of the modern world? First and foremost, it exemplifies the difficulties in creating 
coherent narrative around decisions taken by man in what this paper will refer to as the non-
Newtonian world of politics. In Newtonian physics each action will have an equal and opposite 
reaction which can be replicated and is calculable. In the non-Newtonian world of politics (or 
virtually any field of social science), the consequences of any single decision can be diffuse and 
incalculable. Attempts can be made to understand events in posterity. We can claim that the cause 
of the 2008 financial crash was over-leveraging in the financial system. But maybe it was caused by 
the complex mortgage backed securities on offer. or even simple human complacency that the so-
called Great Moderation would continue unabated as with Gordon Brown's proclamation of and 
"end to boom and bust." In retrospect, any of these arguments can be argued to be the cause, but 
the simpler truth is that there was a degree of randomness we cannot account for, that was caused 
by the non-Newtonian proclivities of politics and social theory. In other words, it is Taleb’s fat-tailed 
risk which has led to the inculcation of risk discourse as a new means of power relations. 
The sociologist Ulrich beck first noted this in relation to the potential problems created by modern 
science and technology. Disasters like Three Mile Island and the encroaching dangers associated 
with climate change reveal the potential unintended consequences of modern decision making. In 
the past, the greatest dangers to mankind largely arose from natural disasters such as floods, 
drought or disease; in today's world, many of these problems have been mitigated or even 
eradicated in the west. Instead we are left with reflexive problems, that is, problems that are caused 
by our own creations. Because of this, he argued that we were now living in what he termed a Risk 
Society “increasingly preoccupied with debating, preventing and managing risk. (Beck & Levy, 2013)" 
This is the systematization of understanding the unanticipated consequences of our decisions. An 
attempt to identify these consequences and prevent harm being caused by them, whilst also 
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remaining lithe and awake to the always present danger of the unknown. Risks that can be 
anticipated can be mitigated; those that cannot need to be contained, studied, and appropriate 
stratagems for their next occurrence worked out. 
"However..." continues Beck, "unlike earlier manifestations of risk characterised by daring actions or 
predictability models, global risk can no longer be calculated or forecast. Accordingly, more influence 
accrues to the perception of risk, largely constructed by media representations (pp.3).”  This is the 
consequence of non-Newtonian, reflexively made risks. They are difficult, if not impossible, to 
entirely calculate, or even attribute causation too. Importance then lies on the management of 
perception of risk. The unintended consequences of modern society call into question the 
foundations of society. Warning of unintended consequences is another form of knowledge (risk) 
posited in opposition to 'expert' opinion by other experts or lays creating a myriad interpretation of 
knowledge across all strata of society that call into questions the authority of 'expert' opinion and 
the knowledge at the base of society. The first position that experts can take in defence of this is to 
propagate unawareness by not allowing the unintended consequences of their decisions to fall into 
common knowledge. If not, then this knowledge of unintended consequences is politicised through 
its contestation, and a struggle emerges as to whether the expert’s decision, and the foundational 
columns of modernity, need to be re-evaluated. The second recourse that experts can take in the 
light of this questioning is to ask what the unintended consequences of this re-evaluation will be. 
This then places the critic into the position of expert and allows them to be questioned using their 
own methods. Perception of risk thus becomes the most important battleground in the risk society. 
Once something is labelled as a risk it calls into question all prior knowledge made up to the decision 
that caused the unintended consequences. If something is not labelled as a risk then it is not 
questioned, and the position of the expert maintains its knowledge-based power (Beck, 1999, 
p.120). Unawareness can be used for the maintenance of position of power when kept from non-
experts, and also used as a tool to critique the critic of the expert by exploring the unintended 
consequence of their alternative visions. Unawareness is the cardinal sin as it is the open sluice-gate 
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for unintended consequences; to admit unawareness is to admit to the possibility of error, no 
matter how multifaceted the issue. Power, in the Risk Society, is based on knowledge and the 
management of perceptions of risk and understanding – to admit limits to that knowledge 
diminishes power. Keynes may well have been aware of Kalecki’s criticisms but to admit to them 
would have been to admit to a loss of expertise or understanding.  
 
For Beck the ultimate example of this new globalised risk comes in the form of ecological disasters, 
manufactured by industrial activity which is essential to modernity but also unintentionally 
detrimental. These tensions between what is necessary for the continuation of the market society 
that we inhabit - particularly with its necessity for growth - and what should be done to mitigate the 
impact of these necessities, creates a stasis wherein new threats are constantly identified and 
portrayed in the media, yet rarely solved. Admission, on the part of the expert, of unawareness of 
unintended consequences diminishes awareness of what has happened by moving the argument on 
to a contestation of knowledge rather than the understanding of how prior decisions have led to 
these decisions. Whilst not admitting to unawareness on the part of the critic precludes the 
possibility of discourse around the reflexive facets of modernity. Beck argues that these threats 
actually create an egalitarian effect throughout the world risk society as they are relayed in the same 
manner across the globe but perceived within highly localised cultural narratives – “the 
apprehension of global risks as the anticipation of (localised) risks. (Beck, 2009)” The experts of one 
society causing harm upon another through the unintended consequences of reflexive modernity. 
These risks are of such a scale that the effects will be felt across all strata of society (although as 
Dean Curran has pointed out, wealth will always provide for “private escape routes” when operating 
in a market system. (2013, p.54) 
Within an interconnected world beset by myriad disasters of its own creation, the failsafe of a 
managerially schooled elite is the notion that these problems are outside of their control, neatly 
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apportioning blame to what Beck has termed the “global other. (Beck, 2009)” That is other members 
of the global community that do not choose to act in the manner best in the interest of their local. 
The inability to alter global politics without concerted effort from all sides provides a scapegoat but 
also leads to stasis, dissolution of interest in politics and apathy through a form of political universal 
relativism (Mosley, L., 2005. pp.359). Although these issues could ultimately affect all of mankind (this 
constantly portrayed in the portrayal of risk in the media), the myriad interests of nation states in 
the continuation of the market capitalism of second modernity creates the impression that the key 
to solving these problems are being presented outward from the nation state but not reciprocated 
on a global level. In other words, whilst our politicians make claims about solving climate change 
there is always the non-cooperation of another nation or player within the market that makes our 
contribution trivial. Others view things in their own way. The “global other is in our midst” (Beck, U., 
2011. pp.24) yet they are still portrayed as unaware of the consequences of their actions upon the 
particular local voiced by politicians and journalists. 
To understand this phenomenon, it is useful to consider how value systems can be communicated, 
and operated across, an increasingly global space. How can we conceptualise of universalist 
relativism through values? And how can these impasses be overcome? As with Beck’s conception of 
the glocal, values can be seen to hold universal truth but be interpreted through practice in a 
manner highly dependent on the cultural and historical milieu of the nation state.  Kwame Anthony 
Appiah argues this case as such; the status of women differs enormously across the globe. For the 
West women are seen as equals to men (in speech if not entirely in material circumstance), whilst in 
Arab countries women are hidden from view and protected. The universal value here, Appiah 
argues, is the common understanding of the value of women – the relativist distinction lies in how 
this value is practiced. For the West it is about parity and equality of individuals, for Arabic countries 
it is practiced through protection and valuation of women’s sanctity. “In belief, as in everything else, 
each of us must start from where we are (Appiah, 2007, pp.38)” – where we are being a function of 
the culture we habit.  
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There is a similarity here in the conception of universal values and the relativist portrayal of the 
global other's reaction to the universal risks of Beck’s risk society. Each side can see a common 
ground, but the practices that shape how this common ground is played out can differ wildly – 
sometimes to antagonistic levels. To secure understanding between these relativist practices 
requires a dialectic, one that takes time to bring change to fruition and may as equally change one’s 
own practices as it does the other’s. This understanding of universal relativism plays out the same 
battle as the expert and the critic in the admission of unawareness. There is a conception of a central 
truth behind the knowledge, but to admit that this knowledge may have differing consequences for 
different people posits each side against the other. The value of women may well be the central 
truth - as may be the scientific knowledge of nuclear power - but the difference in interpretation 
between agents, devoid of admission of unawareness or unknowledge, creates barriers to discourse, 
and obfuscates the ability to mediate between differing positions. The similarity between a dialectic 
of values and a dialectic of understanding in risk society lies in the shared understanding of the 
importance of something, and the uniformity of market systems being used to tackle risks. Cultures 
can and always have learned from one another and in an increasingly connected world it would be 
foolish to consider one’s culture as entirely located within the nation state as so much is borrowed 
and disseminated from across the globe. Forces of globalisation allow room for relativist value 
judgements whilst provide the same apparatus for enacting - apparatus that contain value 
judgments of their own - it is in the manner in which these tools are enacted that the differences 
between locals takes place.  
Some of the greatest difficulties in relativism arise from positions so seemingly close. Take for 
instance the divergent claims of pro-life and pro-choice campaigners. The key value that each hold is 
that of individual liberty – for the pro-choice campaigner this means the individual liberty of the 
mother, for the pro-life this means the liberty of the unborn child. Within western society individual 
liberty is held sacrosanct but the two differing comprehensions of this value place the two groups at 
loggerheads. A similar disparity of understanding can be seen in Theresa May’s Brexit speech on 17th 
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January. For her Britain has always been “internationalist”, an ideal that she portrays as hampered 
by membership of the European Union. May also points to differences between codified and 
uncodified constitutions in her speech believing that each uphold the same values but that codified 
constitutions “bends towards uniformity” rather than the flexibility offered to the UKs parliamentary 
system and uncodified constitution. May then follows by stating that 
“there are two ways of dealing with different interests. You can respond by trying to hold 
things together by force, tightening a vice-like grip that ends up crushing into tiny pieces the 
very things you want to protect. Or you can respect difference, cherish it even, and reform 
the EU so that it deals better with the wonderful diversity of its member states. (BBC News, 
2017)” 
 
What is apparent here is the shared notion of universal values, but of very different practices within 
the body of the nation state. Similarly, within arguments around nuclear power, there is an 
admission on both sides of the power and science of nuclear technologies. One side see the 
potential upsides such as cheap and relatively green energy. Others see the negatives, the 
environmental impacts and amazing destructive force. Admission of unintended consequences from 
either side diffuses their respective arguments. The environmentalist does not want nuclear power 
but may therefore sacrifice one of the easiest gateways to clean energy on a grand scale. The 
nuclear technician wants to harness the power generating technologies of nuclear technology for 
environmental purposes but shudders at the thought of allowing more volatile nations access to 
nuclear power. Unawareness, or in-admission of awareness on one side, is often the argument of 
the other.  This is where the politicisation of issues of reflexive modernity takes shape. Perception of 
risk shapes either sides argument and is often mediated to the wider public through media. As 
Catherine Althaus puts it; “risk offers scientific pretensions of neutrality to meet the needs of the 
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new global order just as much as notions of sin and taboo offered other societies notions with which 
to blame dangerous individuals who threatened the community.” (pp. 575)  
Because of these complexities the only recourse of government is the management and mitigation 
of risk, the management of unawareness. It is the unawareness of unintended consequences that 
provide the dangers of the risk society. Known dangers have already been dealt with. Management 
of unawareness removes issues from politicisation. This is the role that journalism plays in the 
construction of second modernity. Their position can be leveraged to create awareness of risk 
through means such as public awareness campaigns, investigative journalism, reportage of 
impending risks and investigation of their unintended consequences. Much of the traditional role of 
the journalist has been that of a mediator between expert and lay, relaying information back and 
forth, be that the expert, or the political class, academic, or scientist. On the other hand, journalists 
can be used to manufacturer unawareness through either naturalisation of perspective, preferential 
status given to one side of the debate surrounding unintended consequences, or in the more firm 
handed approach of editorial and political collusion analysed by Noam Chomsky in Manufacturing 
Consent (Chomsky, 1998). Journalists also play a key role in the translation of the global risk in to the 
consequences for the local; they are intrinsically involved in the glocalisation of risk through their 
commercial need to tailor their content to be of relevance for their target audience. Media outlets 
also contribute to impressions of the global other. Nuclear disaster makes such a great story because 
of its danger on a global (and therefore local scale). This manifests itself into the discourse of risk 
within journalism through empathic depiction of foreign disasters. Susan Yell has illustrated how 
emotive language and highly personal stories are used by media outlets to engender a sense of 
community between different cultures through appeal to universal emotions (Yell, 2012).  
Risk is an acknowledgement of the unknown, but in the highly technical sense of risk management. It 
is an admission of unknown, unintended consequences, but ones that can be technically managed, 
apprehended and accounted for despite their current unknowability. as Beck puts it - (Beck, 2009: 
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197-198) "The specific ontology of risk finds expression in the overcoming of the difference between 
reality and representation, where the key factor is the anticipation of becoming real." Risk is the 
anticipation of unintended consequences. The representation of risk is the controlling of 
unawareness, the management of discourse between lay and expert, and the means of rebuttal to 
the expert which can itself subject the critic to the same criticisms as applied to the experts. This is 
only possible in second modernity due to the unique characteristics of the non-Newtonian risks that 




Why is Risk Discourse Important in the Context 
of Brexit? 
Quand c'est flou, il y a un loup " [when it is blurred, there is a wolf - a 
danger] 
Proof of the overwhelmingly uncertain nature of the risk and opportunities presented on either side 
of the campaign can be found in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index published by the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty group. This group have analysed newspapers over the last 30 years and across 
continents for signs of economic uncertainty in comparison to market volatility. This tool had been 
initially made for Forex investors but proves a useful tool for analysing the cultural prevalence of 
uncertainty across newspapers. The graph below illustrates the spike in uncertainty caused by Brexit. 
Although other instances in the UKs recent past have caused uncertainty - such as the UK crashing 
out of the ERM in 1992, or the 2008 financial crash - no event bred linguistic uncertainty in the 
manner of Brexit. Perhaps this is because unlike those previous events which had been experienced 
at varying degrees and are somewhat expected in the boom and bust nature of capitalism, Brexit can 
be seen as a direct democratic decision to move against the prevailing trends of global capitalism. 
Uncertainty as a trend seems to have been increasing ever since the 2008 financial crash as the clear 
opportunities and risks of pre-2008 globalisation have been replaced by a new economic playing 
field of low-interest rates and huge monetary stimulus (Ban, 2015). Uncertainty increases 
speculation on risks and opportunities the identified dangers or gains of familiar territory are 
replaced by hesitancy in a new economic environment. In short, they arise from a lack of confidence. 
The Brexit campaign was a test of confidence in the status-quo as reflected in the massive spike in 
uncertainty during the campaign. Stick or twist? When neither argument seems a sure thing 
uncertainty as to the correct path finds itself present within journalism, finance and the wider 
culture. Risk discourse is a method for managing uncertainty and as such has come to the fore 









Figure 5: UK Policy Uncertainty Index.  Available from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/ 
 
Risk Management, Professions, and Risk Discourse 
To understand how the dominant discourse of risk management came to be such an influence on the 
coverage of the Brexit campaign we must first ascertain how the literature of risk management has 
"constituted and constructed the world in meaning (Foucault, 1979)." As Blyth and others have 
noted, from the collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods economic system, there has been a distinct 
policy shift in the west towards a model of shareholder capitalism that privileges price stability over 
full employment. Alongside this, economics as a subject has retreated away from discussions of 
Keynes’s animal spirits (with its recognition of the limitations of scientific exactitude within 
economics) and has instead attempted to solidify its position as a mathematical and scientific 
subject. As such, models and theorems have been constructed and utilised to great effect using data 
from the past. This data from the past cannot however reveal the limitations of such models from 
endogenous threats not already identified by the data (Zenghelis, 2014). Enter risk management as a 
growing facet of public practice since the early 1980s. Risk management aimed to marry the ability 
to manage identified risks that economic modelling shed light upon, whilst also drawing up 
contingency plans and always being on the lookout for the new potential threats to these models.  
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Ken McDonagh and Yee-Kuong-Hing have researched the history of risk management as being 
ontologically linked to the political economy of certain ages in modern development (2015, pp.408-
425). The first stage in this development arrived with mercantile shipping as part of a means to 
insure against losses and aligns to the etymological findings of Gaspar Merial mentioned earlier 
(Mariel, 2011). Key features of this form of risk management are the use of lay knowledge rather 
than mathematical or technical understanding of probability and a basis in the private sector due to 
the comparative weaknesses of state protection when undertaking trade across borders. This form 
of risk management continues until after the second world war at which point there is an ideological 
shift in the understanding of socialising risk through the apparatus of the state, in conjunction with 
the managed risks of the cold war nuclear capabilities. Certain risks, such as healthcare, 
unemployment, and protection from natural disasters are collectivised through state apparatus, 
whilst the brutal logic of the cold war allows for the creation of a regime of "technical rationality" 
stemming from mathematical research into game theory (pp.414).  These "technical solutions..." to 
risk carried with them the "risk that politicians and military commanders would [be] lulled into 
believing that they possessed a degree of control that they did not actually have" especially when 
confronted with "events that occur beyond their design parameters (pp.416)." The end of the cold 
war was one such event and so was the collapse of the post-war consensus in Keynesian economics. 
From the late 1980s, globalisation has changed the states approach to risk management by 
"decentre[ing] the state and decreas[ing] its capacity and/or willingness to control" these new 
globalised risks. (pp.417)" To mitigate against increasingly global risks at a time when the state is in 
retreat, much of risk management theory and practice has been outsourced economic interests that 
"are also generating powerful market incentives that reinforce securitising practices. (pp.417)" In 
effect, this has created a need to perpetuate a culture of risk for the market players involved in 
privatised security whilst also depoliticising the technical expertise of identification and mitigation of 
risk. Although much of what McDonagh and Kuang-Heng focus on is tied to more traditional security 
risks, these same broad changes in how political economy has adapted with, and most importantly 
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incorporated risks management practices, is equally tied to economic risk management practices 
and has similarly helped to create a dominant discourse closely tied to the financial architecture of 
global economy.  
This conception of risk ontologically linked to the day’s political economy, has spawned a 
professional understanding of risk linked to the circumstances of our time. Risk management has 
evolved to incorporate an internationally recognised body of works, standards and practices that in 
the words of Hardy & Maguire "draw on one another in well-established ways to contrast 
convergent and widely shared descriptions and explanations of phenomena (2016).” This is very 
similar to Norman Fairclough and Lilie Chouliaraki’s (1999) understanding of discourses tied to 
professions, and thus excluding the lay that was discussed earlier. The standard approaches of risk 
management create a framework for understanding and reacting to identified dangers, and for how 
to react to risks that are not identified until it is too late. From the point of view of the Brexit debate, 
it could be argued that the dominant discourse of risk was in full view in the form of the remain 
campaign and the wealth of experts that sided with this position. To them Brexit was an avoidable 
danger that had no precedent in the literature and practices of the dominant discourse. Blair's 
famous statement that to debate whether globalisation is a good thing is to "debate whether 
autumn should follow summer (BBC News, 2005)", illustrates the inevitability of globalisation that 
the dominant discourse has propagated partly through the fact that there have been no attempts to 
backtrack on it politically, or within the discourse itself. As Burnham (2001) remarked in his study of 
the depoliticising tactics of the New Labour government, it is often better to not bring risks or 
decisions into the political sphere. In this way risks or unknowns can be managed without admitting 
to unawareness. Brexit is an aberration for those tied to the dominant discourse of risk 
management, not necessarily because of the dangers that it could spell to the UK economy, but 
because movement in that direction challenges the assumptions of the dominant discourse and puts 
into questions their authority which stems from intimate knowledge of the discourse. It re-
55 
 
politicises, previously depoliticised risks and calls into question the authority of the expert within this 
particular professionalised discourse. 
Discourses create "the objects of which they speak" partly through their ability to create hierarchies 
of knowledge which "produce clear meanings about who and what is normal, standard and 
acceptable thereby institutionalising practices and producing behaviour (Hardy & Maguire, 2016).” 
There is no point in managing risk if the object that you trying to protect from risk is of no value to 
you. As such, there is a common ground of understanding amongst all practitioners of risk 
management that what they are trying to protect is agreed upon by everyone, and that those who 
do not agree with this course of risk management are against the majority and against the discourse. 
Views in opposition to the dominant discourse get their pronouncers labelled as seditious, feckless 
or incompetent. They are exogenous threats that must be managed according to the discourse. 
What is precluded is an understanding that the objects upon which such energies are being 
expended to prevent from harm, may well be themselves doing harm to the voices who are labelled 
as exogenous to the dominant discourse. As we saw earlier, (see Figure 3: Global income distribution 
growth 1988 – 2008) there have been many beneficiaries from globalisation who understandably 
would like to maintain the pace of transformation it has instigated across the world. On the other 
hand, there have been a growing number of people who have not witnessed these benefits. To 
those who have not witnessed the benefits, their willingness to take the risks identified by risk 
management practices does not come out of spite, but rather out of an understanding that the 
status quo does not offer opportunities that are worth protecting from risk any longer. To them, the 
risks of Brexit may instead be framed as opportunities. 
Hardy and Maguire have labelled the "three models for organising risk (pp.85)." These models occur 
at different points in the apprehension of risk beginning with the organisation of risks prospectively. 
This is the attempt to scrutinise data and models for risks to the stability of the model and to 
theorise where the next exogenous threat may come so as to attempt to define and incorporate 
56 
 
these risks into the model. The scientific nature of the endeavour endows the discourse with 
"regularities, such as 'facts'" so as to "ensure that the risk does not arise, or to be ready to manage it 
through the preparation of plans, scripts, and protocols in the event that it does (pp.86)." In term of 
journalism this is the most likely form that risk management discourse will be revealed due to the 
nature of journalism as ephemeral and not involved as a profession in the formulation of precise 
procedures or the follow-through stages of risk management. Journalism is often concerned with 
reporting upon the possibilities that may unfold from the minutiae of the day-to-day that is being 
reported upon. Risk management in this form is the basis for its existence as a dominant discourse 
for it is through the ascription of risk through prediction and theorisation that an ideal outcome is 
worked towards, whilst problematic risks are identified and negated if possible. As Hardy and 
Maguire have pointed out, the presence of a dominant discourse of risk management allows 
participants to create knowledge that is "assumed to be authoritative, unbiased, reliable and 
complete thereby producing confidence in its ability to accurately identify the likelihood and 
magnitude of negative events. In contrast lay knowledge is framed as 'politicized' and irrational 
(pp.87)." By studying the way in which risks are portrayed as either factual for experts or as only 
perceived by lays the coverage of the Brexit referendum, there could well be evidence of this 
exclusion from the dominant discourse. Alternatively, positive-risk framing may be used to lampoon 
the 'fact' hypothesis of expert predictions. 
The key aim of prospective risk management is to create patterns and procedures that can be 
adhered to in the event of a risk coming to pass. This then feeds into reactive risk management 
whereby procedures are utilised and adapted to react to the encroaching risk. David A. Moss has 
identified the key tools of this form of risk-management to be "shifting, spreading and reduction” of 
risks (Moss, 2002, pp.23)". Shifting refers to moving the source of risk from one place to another and 
is often seen in a political context by apportioning blame for events onto parties’ other than one's 
own. Spreading risk refers to the socialisation of risk touched upon earlier and reduction refers to 
the implementation of plans put in place by the prospective risk management to contain any 
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damage resultant from the occurred risk. This second type of risk management is likely to be 
observed in the week after the vote as rival factions seek to apportion blame, new political leaders 
emerged and plans for mitigating risk, such as the Band of England's moves to reassure markets, 
were acted upon arise. Journalists play a key part in this reactive risk management as the narrative 
that they spin in the days after an event can often coalesce into the national mythos of what 
happened in those days and can rapidly apportion blame or outrage on the parties involved. Their 
commentary on the plans put into place by government and economic influencers can also help to 
shape the mood of markets and institutions and seek to bolster levels of confidence that is so crucial 
to long-term investment.   
So far, this paper has analysed what is meant by risk in a technical sense by analysing the history of 
the word, the differences between gaussian bell-curve distribution and fat-tailed endogenous risk. 
The link has then been made between endogenous risk and the growing complexities of an 
increasingly interconnected world, and this shift in understanding of risk has created a new 
discourse through which risk can be understood and managed. The relevance of this to the Brexit 
debate has also been analysed within the context of expert versus lay understanding of the world, 
depoliticization of certain political decisions that have become central to the Brexit debate, and the 
impact of endogenous risk within the context of modern political risk management techniques.  
Alongside technological change there has been rapid shift in economic policy that has both 
contained and underpinned the rise of the discourse of risk through the realisation that each new 
system contains the seeds of its own destruction by analysing toe 2008 financial crisis, and the 
downfall of Keynesianism in the 1970s. This understanding has fostered the importance of risk 
discourses as a means of power relationship between expert and lay. The next section of this paper 
intends to understand how Journalism has been affected by globalisation, the problematic 
relationship between risk discourse and the position of journalists as interlocutor between expert 
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and lay, and why the journalism surrounding the Brexit debate is worthy of further attention to 





Risk Discourse and globalisation – the effects upon 
Journalism 
Globalised versus localised journalism? 
As Beck and Friedman have pointed out, there are two distinct but overlapping positions within 
globalisation; namely the local and the global. Media and policy work together to navigate the 
difficulties of these contrasting opinions through representations of the global other, managing 
perceptions of risk, and creating methods of understanding between cultures in the global context. 
Making the global relevant, interesting and entertaining to the local market that you are aimed for is 
the key challenge for journalism when working in a globalised world. As mentioned above, this can 
be done through the appeal to basic emotions as appears in the personalised tales to disasters. 
Alternatively, though, news media can work to create the illusion that regionally based 
understanding is that of the global. As Stephen D Reese, has noted "...economic and cultural 
globalisation is further along than that of politics, and journalism has always been closely tied to 
democratic structures (2010, p.344)." This contains within it the danger that a culture more in tune 
with globalisation can be portrayed in news media, whilst readers may not recognise these trends in 
their own more locally tied interpretations of culture and politics. Because of this, journalism can 
increase apathy through imposition of the global consensus - often tied to that of financial markets - 
as that of the local. In the context of the Brexit debate, the prominence of frustration with the 
European Union was tied to a feeling of the supersedence of national politics by that of the 
transnational EU. A metropolitan elite were targeted as being lackeys of a global order, whilst papers 
such as the Daily Mail espoused an increasingly patriotic tone (more of which later). If economics has 
been depoliticised, then the political was on its way to being removed from the national as well, 
increasing the sense of alienation from a political class that was already seen as non-representative, 
by removing their national purpose as well. Political power being replaced by that of advisor to an 
increasingly globalised power relation structure.  
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Reese highlights this by noting that "Changes in media reflect the large crux of globalisation that it 
simultaneously facilitates certain 'monoculture' global standards along with the proliferation of a 
host of micro-communities that were not possible before (2010, pp.345)". If these micro-
communities stand in opposition to the global monoculture, then the lack of self-identification they 
detect in the media will increase apathy and frustration.  Journalists, like others of the so-called 
metropolitan elite move in, and report on, circles that are often institutionally predisposed towards 
the tendencies of globalisation or have depoliticised the objectives of globalisation.  
Alternatively, Kai Hafez, in the Myth of Media Globalisation (2005), wonders whether the much-
vaunted CNN effect, or truly global news sources exist at all. Media enterprises are not truly global 
as they are still inherently tied to the locale of their production. Predominantly the reportage is 
focused on that of their parent country, and although they may report on occurrences in other 
countries, it will tend to be only those of huge global import or of particular entertainment value. 
Local events are weighted far higher in terms of import. In the case of journalism from the 
Anglosphere, and its particular style of liberal journalism, a very centrist outlook is portrayed. This 
outlook is centrist for the Anglosphere, attempting objectivity, but really from a relativist initial 
standpoint as this centrist position would seem strongly left or right leaning in many countries. The 
myth of media globalisation confuses an increase in reporting on global events with any growth in 
understanding between polities. This conflation between scope and understanding could be seen to 
actually increase divisions in understanding as a single culturally influenced outlook is used to infer 
understanding across cultures. Differences in opinion across cultures are not examined in terms of 
their cultural relativism, rather, through the obstinacy of the other's refusal to agree with the 
paper’s taken for granted viewpoint.  Hafez also makes the argument that growth in liberal 
cosmopolitanism across nations is less a feature of globalisation, than it is a feature of 
modernisation. If this is the case, then an acknowledgement of modernisation's reflexive creation of 
risk, would lead to a greater knowledge between nations of their complicity in global problems. It 
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seems that the lack of a global understanding is evidenced through the rise of patriotism across 
Europe to blame the other for the issues modernisation has instead contributed to. 
Igor Vobic argues that this does not take place because news media is the local looking out (2010). 
News media is local news interpreting global events and although news might reflect broader global 
political and economic ideas, the impact this actually has in creating global citizens is suspect. There 
is "little to no attention" given to the question as to whether or not reporting on global events 
actually creates a sort of identification as global citizens amongst an audience. Vobic then comments 
on a "growing commercialisation in journalism, a trend toward the commodification of news, and 
the diminishing political relevance of news work. (Vobic, pp.2)" This could be seen as a consequence 
of media outlet's need to compete on a global frontier, thus weakening the returns for the political 
function that journalism has traditionally operated. Equally though it could be a consequence of the 
move towards a politics of depoliticization and the effects of the "golden straightjacket". If there is 
simply less room for manoeuvre in policy, and that which is enacted is sheathed in the weight of 
expert opinion, then there it is harder to hold politicians to account as was done in the past. Couple 
this with a necessity to fill 24-hour news cycles, and commodification of news seems inevitable. 
 
Financial Journalism 
One aspect of journalism that is undeniably global in its outlook is that of financial journalism. There 
is still a need to relay the applicability of any story to that of the local, but the difference lies in the 
target audience for financial journalism. These are people who benefit from and have internalised 
the values of globalisation. Outlets such as Bloomberg could potentially make claim to be more 
globally orientated than CNN due to the necessity for reporting on global events in an economic 
context, as well as the cosmopolitan make-up of their target audience. Their target audience can be 
seen as a consequence of the tendencies of globalisation. Micky Lee argues that this awareness of 
the global outlook of their audience, coupled with an underlying liberal mindset that individuals 
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make up their own minds, means that financial journalists "deny the watchdog function, seeing their 
role as presenting information for the audience to interpret.(Lee, 2014, pp.716)" Tabloids do not 
usually include detailed financial journalism unless the story is particularly newsworthy partly due to 
the level of technicality, and partly due to the difficulty in conferring applicability upon the local. 
Financial journalism, due to its tendency to deliver raw facts does not serve as an appropriate basis 
for the evaluation of risk to the layman due to its sheer technicality. Yet interpretation is paramount 
in financial journalism. 
Lee argues that economies are language constructs and as such the pressures placed upon financial 
journalists lead them to be complicit in the framing techniques of elites and business PR that seeks 
to lay the blame for crashes elsewhere (Lee, pp.718). Confidence is key in markets and as such the 
framing of any economic issue within the correct parlance can animate the bestial nature of market 
participants. These framing devices are also integral to the manner in which nation states present 
transnational disasters to their citizens and justify programmes such as austerity. 
24-hour news cycles 
Selling internationally also requires availability at all hours. For the news market, this requires 24-
hour news cycles through which to reflect the ever-changing events happening across the globe. 
Newspapers cannot reflect this 24-hour cycle due to their daily print, but many of their parent 
organisations operate websites or TV channels that do embody this notion. Cushion, Lewis and 
Rogers (2015) undertook a longitudinal survey of UK news outlets (primarily the BBC and ITV) to 
understand how this 24-hour news cycle was impacting upon editorial choices and content. They 
found that presenters and guests were increasingly being asked for opinion and analysis of breaking 
news stories with very little time to reflect, and even less time to garner further knowledge as to the 
background of any new story. It could be argued that the increasing prevalence of this kind of knee-
jerk journalism creates an irrelevance of information in as much as no news story can be discussed in 
any great depth before the next event takes place. It creates a flitting stream of constant stories 
overwhelming the viewer with newness in much the same way as Hollywood movie editing has 
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moved towards a lessening of the time each frame is allowed to occupy space (Cutting, et al. 2011).  
This kind of analysis is cheap to produce, entertaining in its controversy, and allows the newscaster 
to take on the role of their audience, acting out the living room's speculating on what has occurred, 
rather than engaging in the difficult work of investigative journalism. As Jeff Zucker, President of 
CNN Worldwide, puts it they "are characters in a drama. (New York Times, 2017)" The Panel's first 
priority is entertainment rather than journalism. This also has a knock-on effect for the kinds of 
stories that are covered as topics such as the economy are, by their very nature, far drier than crime 
or a scandal. 
 
How do newspapers decide what to write about Europe? 
When analysing newspaper output it is important to distinguish between traditional news articles 
(reporting of hard facts), versus columns (opinions). Traditionally the line between these two forms 
of reporting has been clearly defined with opinion clearly labelled as such, but in recent years many 
news outlets have somewhat blurred the line. In response to public criticism of this practice in The 
New York Times, Clark Hoyt (2008) provided an example of how news reporting can still be used to 
put forth opinion despite remaining objectively routed in the facts of the article in questions.  
“Last Tuesday, a “Sidebar” column by Liptak appeared on the front page, exploring the startling (my 
opinion) fact that Congress gave the homeland security secretary the power to waive any law at all 
in order to build a border fence. Environmental groups have appealed to the Supreme Court, saying 
that Congress ceded too much of its power. Liptak, a lawyer who was a counsel for The New York 
Times Company before becoming a reporter, explained the constitutional issues and the arguments 
on both sides, just as he would have in a news article. But with flicks of language that his editors call 
“voice,” he led me to a conclusion — right or wrong — that he thinks it is a bad law. He cemented 
that impression for me with one of the oldest tools at a columnist’s disposal, a ringing kicker, or last 
64 
 
paragraph, that gives one side the last word, in this case a quote that Liptak called “apt” from Justice 
Anthony Kennedy: “Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.” 
Such stylistic tricks allow for an individual journalist’s voice to come across in the article, but can just 
as easily be utilised by an editor to reinforce the editorial line on key issues that the paper may want 
to voice an opinion on. 
Julie Firmstone conducted interview with leader writers, editors, EU correspondents and political 
editors into the process that takes place at ten leading UK daily newspapers, in how it is decided 
how and when editorial pieces will tackle the issue of Europe (Firmstone, 2008). In it, she identifies 
four guiding principles that determine the news value of a piece on Europe, and how a leader writer 
voice an opinion on the subject given the unique nature of each newspapers working structures. The 
initial stage is deciding upon an issue that paper wishes to comment upon. This is driven by a 
number of factors including: relevance to topical trends, whether or not the paper has previously 
treated the matter as a key priority, the engagement of the paper’s readership on the issue, and the 
prevalence of the issue within the wider press. In most cases the paper would have to be running an 
article upon the subject of Europe to which the editorial would respond. Secondly, the editorial line 
is decided amongst a smaller group of journalists including the editor and leader writer, although 
when it came to the Tabloid journalists that were interviewed there was a much smaller group who 
decided upon the selection and content of the article, often being reduced to the editor and leader 
writer without consultation from the writer of the original article to which the editorial was 
responding to. Thirdly the article was written by the leader writer, and lastly the editorial was 
subject to editorial approval or amendment. Within each paper the degree of oversight would vary 
dramatically. Certain papers, such as The Mail, or Murdoch papers having very clearly defined lines 




Recent shifts within the newspaper industry - with particular reference to the loss of advertising 
revenue and readership to readers moving online – has led to a need for many papers to group 
together and utilise their economies of scale to deliver the same content as had been delivered in 
the past. Trinity mirror, which in 2018 bought Richard Desmond’s publishing assets including the 
Daily Express and Daily Star. As the Guardian reported, this will allow Trinity to pool assets for 
reporting on subject such as sport saving the group £20m annually (Sweeney, 2018). Crucially 
though, there would be no pooling of resources for political or editorial writing as this was seen as a 
key asset of each paper. Mcknight accused News Corporation of enforcing a group-wider editorial 
line on certain subjects such a free-markets and opposition to European enlargement (McKnight, 
pp.308), whereas other groups are keen to preserve the editorial independence of their papers. 
Having a difference of opinion amongst a group of papers means of course that different audiences 
can be reached and profited from. It seems then, that what UK newspapers decide to print and 
comment upon in regard to Europe depends on a variety of factors from news values to proprietor 
interests, whilst even papers with strong editorial opinions one way or the other still allow room in 
opinion or comment pieces for dissenting views from the editorial line to be voiced. 
As mentioned previously, UK newspapers have not provided a space for European discourse within 
their reporting to the same extent as many continental papers. There is less editorial focus on 
Europe generally, fewer UK journalists based permanently in Brussels, and less mention of European 
issues from politicians in the years leading up to the referendum for reasons stemming from the 
need to keep certain newspaper proprietors onside, to internal party management issues. Because 
of this much of the UK press coverage of Europe tends to be in relation to how European politics 
may affect national politics, rather than in seeing the UK as a key player within European politics. 




This somewhat isolationist attitude can exacerbate some of what Trenz has called the ‘dumbing 
down’ tendencies of newspaper reporting (Trenz, 2008, pp.293). 
 Democracy Enhancing Dumbing Down 
Media Function (desired) outcome (undesired) outcome 
Passive Mirror of the political Transparency Inherent nationalism 
 Amplifier of rational 
discourse 
Justification Entertainment 
Active Third Estate Critique, control Voice of powerful 
 Popular voice popularization Cynicism 
Table 1: Potential consequences of reporting of democratic functions of journalism (Trenz, 2008) 
 
 The column labelled democracy contains the enlightenment understanding of what good reporting 
can do to breed a healthy discourse within a public including the tradition ideas of papers being the 
Third Estate which holds the powerful to account. The second column contains the aspects of 
democracy that papers enhance such as transparency by reporting on the goings on of government, 
or justification, by explaining to the public using expert correspondence why such decision shave 
been made by governments. The ‘dumbing down’ column explains how through a combination of 
nationalistic outlook (as opposed to the European discourse of continental papers) and the need for 
increasing readership within a market economy, some of these enhancing tendencies can be turned 
completely upside down. Transparency can be turned into a story of European government acting 
against British national interests. Critique of European affairs can often instead simply be the 
critique of the proprietors against European decisions, whilst purporting to report the popular voice 
can lead to an increasing sense of cynicism when comparing national interest to European decision 
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making. In this way journalists are seen to ‘express the needs and sentiments of the ‘ordinary people 
against the system of rationality’ (294), of the rationality of what is perceived to be an elite-led 
project such as the European Union. 
 
How has the risk society been studied in journalism so far? 
Beck's conception of the risk society has been applied to journalism scholarship before, but more 
often as a lens through which to study representations of Beck's primary examples of risks, such as 
environmental disasters. Anticipation of risk is a key component of 24 hours news culture. Without 
it, audiences would not stay tuned in, or they may not buy tomorrow's paper. It provides the most 
watched TV and is used to create a sense of inevitability, a sense of impending doom that makes for 
eminently gripping news. As Simon Cottle puts it: 
The "global reach [of reflexive problems of the risk society], interpenetrating complexity and truly 
catastrophic nature gives rise, justifiably, to a new post-religious discourse of impending apocalyptic 
collapse, whether conceived for example, in terms of 'global integral accident' (Virilio, 2007) or 
'living in the end times’ (Zizek, 2010, p.79)’ (Cottle , 2010). 
When transfixed on the anticipation of risk it is possible that blindness to the causes of the risk can 
arise. The effect of the causes in the creation of risk can and will be identified, but what about the 
causes of the causes? By generating risk through portrayal of anticipation, framing of the portrayal 
becomes all important. Choosing which effects are attributable to which causes, which effects are 
possible to address in a politically expedient manner, or which effects are caused by unassailable 
agents (the global other), or those which the discourse of risk does not contain data on or consider 
an issue, can create a societal blindness to the real causes of potential risks. Anticipation of risk, in 
the middle east, for instance often delimits the scope for investigation into the causes of this risk, be 
it wider geopolitical factors, or issues arising from the political socio-political circumstances of the 
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nations involved. There are a vast number of socio-historical reasons for the regions instability which 
are often simplified or exaggerated in pursuit of the maintenance of a state of risk. 
News media are still culturally and politically aligned to their nation, or their local's, interpretation of 
the global and thus frame the risks that they portray in manners that befit their political reality. It 
could be argued that Britain, being a financial hub and key proponent of free market enterprise, 
framed the Brexit debate around the risks to capital, but chose not to blame capital for any of the 
issues effecting the voting public. Instead this was diverted towards migrants, bureaucrats, and red 
tape. Part of the reason for this, as with financial journalism, is that much of the risk data supplied by 
experts is poorly understood and therefore regurgitated without sufficient analysis or context 
(Nguyen, Lugo-Ocando, 2016). At this point the perception of risk becomes of paramount 
consideration. Data can be interpreted in a number of ways to suit a number of narratives, so it is 
crucial that risks are framed in a manner that does not challenge the dominant discourse. As Beck 
writes, "the specific ontology of risk finds expression in the overcoming of the difference between 
reality and representation, where the key factor is the anticipation of becoming real. (Beck, 2009, 
pp.197-198)"  
This anticipation can, Cottle has argued, lead to a version of policy making that is particularly led by 
journalism through cultural intensification and mobilisation of PR due to their ability to shape 
perceptions of risk. News media is itself in a position of being shaped by and shaping policy through 
the representation of risk. Paula Chakaravartty and John D. H. Downing argue that business 
journalism create the "'miracle of the market' as a hegemonic news frame' (2010). The essay argues 
that the sheer speed of events - especially in a situation as feast flowing as the 2008 Financial Crash - 
leaves readers and journalists befuddled by an onslaught of precise data, yet unequal to the task of 
analysis of this data. "The normal process of social reflection upon past experience and future 
implications, in this instance, regarding economic information in the very present, is virtually 
evacuated. (2010)” The sheer volume of information forces journalists to be reliant on political and 
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technocratic interpretations of the event. This allows the perception of risk to be managed quite 
effectively. Indeed, the environs of 24-hour news cycle lends itself perfectly to this. Risk reporting in 
the media is exponential as in its reporting of risk through deference to experts reporting on 
unknown unknowns, backed up by under evaluated data from the present and historical data of 
questionable applicability to the current potential risk, the danger or risk is further mystified, indeed 
reified, into an event of cataclysmic proportions that feed into markets and the psyche of the 
layman. (Cottle, pp.86) 
Risk related news does not simply become of importance due to the scientific truth with which it is 
noticed. There also has to be cultural resonance to the risk for it to become newsworthy. Celio 
Ferreira writes that risk has to be understood in a wider context than that of language and 
interpretative packages. "The line of thought that assumes that science and technical expertise will 
always dispel the 'myths and rumours' engendered by popular media by simple educating the public 
disregards the fact that successful visual stories always align with arguments that resonate with 
cultural themes found in the social and cultural environment. (Ferreira, 2004, pp.202)" In the context 
of the Brexit debate, which was often framed around risks and opportunities, this cultural resonance 
seems to have had an impact as powerful forces of identity, fear and hope came to play against the 
weight of testimony of experts. Perhaps this is because; "… knowledge may only be vested interests 
in disguise. Science cannot provide evidence of wrongdoing; only the evidence it can provide refers 
to patterns of physical connections, probability of causes and effects, rather than socially defined 
activities (Curran)." Depoliticization has its limits and it could be argued that the positioning of two 
different economic viewpoints, rather than the hegemonic miracle of market position of financial 





Why is this current understanding of risk portrayal in journalism inadequate for 
a true understanding of the reflexive nature of problems? 
This body of pre-existing work only produces half of the picture of how the risk society really 
operates through journalism. What has been analysed very well is the management of the 
perception of risk, but there has been a removal of ideological understandings by the reversion to 
the technical risks of modern technology, and in treating these as exogenous to economic and 
political life. As Curran pointed out, capital can still be used to distance oneself from the effects of 
what Beck thought of as universal problems of second modernity (Curran, 2013).Many of the 
disasters with the greatest reach in our time also stem largely from an economic source. Global 
climate change threatens us all, but the fear of radiation that was prevalent amongst Beck's 
generation after the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island disasters, has not materialised. Instead, the 
disasters that cause the greatest consternation globally (and this is where these disasters differ from 
the localised natural events so far studied), are those caused by the episodic downturns endogenous 
to global capitalism.  
Other facets of capitalism make concentrating on the consequences of technology, rather than the 
means of mediating the society that utilises this technology impotent. As Marx wrote; "money is 
the procurer between man’s need and the object, between his life and his means of life. But that 
which mediates my life for me, also mediates the existence of other people for me. For me it is 
the other person (Marx, 1884)." Capital, and the ability to procure technologies using it, dictates 
what unknown effects of the risk society other individuals will be liable to experience. Industrial 
disasters and health and safety issues, when not caused through lack of knowledge of what could 
occur through implementing risk management initiatives based upon prior-experience and not 
allowing endogenous risk to come from outside of prior experience, can often be attributed to 
efforts to save capital, thus directly exposing others to potential unknown risks. Individuals can also 
be compensated with higher salaries to take on work that is deemed risky. Although this does leave 
agency open to the employee. Finally, we have to accept the conflict of interests that arrive from the 
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accumulation of capital in tackling the dangers of the risk society. Climate change is happening, yet 
despite the sizable scientific evidence, progress has not been made swiftly. There is still too much 
money to be made from oil-extraction, and crucially, just as banks require the continuous creation of 
fresh capital to ensure growth, capitalism requires a constant stream of consumable products to be 
sold. This kind of consumer capitalism can be seen to run directly counter to the aims of 
environmentalism (Greenhaigh, 2005). Finally, just as there are competing interests at the economic 
level, there are also economic interests in the media where a great deal of the management of 
perception of risk takes place. To ignore the fundamental role that capital plays in the perpetuation 
of the risk society is to reduce the role of ideology to that of, as Elliot puts it, industrial fatalism and 
faith in progress (Elliot, 2002) - it does not allow for the application of critical techniques to the 
understanding of risk perspective management. 
 
Key questions 
Having explored the relationship between risk discourse and economics through power-relations 
and endogenous fat-railed risk, this paper has examined the literature surrounding risk discourse in 
journalism highlighting the key position journalists play in the framing of risk, or in the 
manufacturing of unawareness. Earlier on, this paper analysed some of the similarities between 
Britain’s relationship with the European Union and some of the more general criticism of 
globalisation and the Washington Consensus. Because of this, the relationship between experts, 
journalists, and lay, as well as the tension between global and local outlooks, shall be examined in 
much greater depth in the following section through an analysis of the journalism surrounding the 
Brexit referendum of June 2016. This paper aims to address three key questions. 1)How does the 
Brexit debate provide an example of how risk discourse creates a divide between expert and lay? 
2)How does risk discourse alienate certain players and how is this demonstrated within newspaper 
reporting of the Brexit referendum? 3)How does the UK newspaper industry represent the tension 




The Brexit campaign provides an excellent example of how the dominant discourse of risk 
perpetuates itself, and an insight into how this dominance can be used to reinforce a status-quo 
beneficial to the participants of the discourse. The remain campaign was criticised for being ‘Project 
Fear.’ They rarely articulated any positive political message for the importance of staying in Europe, 
and instead preferred to utilise the language of risk management to stress the dangers of potential 
unknown consequences that could present themselves in the event of a vote the leave the EU. If this 
is the case, then how did the leave campaign subvert or work around this discourse? How did it 
harness the language of risk or opportunity to achieve its own political aims in the face of such a 
wealth of expert opinion, and how did this play out in the newspaper journalism before and after 
the referendum? For the leave campaign, these unknowns were not risks, but opportunities. This 
reframing of risks as opportunities afforded the leave campaign a sense of positive âgon (as 
discussed earlier in relation to Roger Caillois’s theory of risk in games), as appealing to a time when 
Britain as a nation-state was in charge of its own destiny, rather than aware of the reflexive nature 
of modern risks.  
Prevalence of risk 
To see whether this is demonstrated in the coverage of the Brexit debate before and after the 
referendum date, this paper proposes first to check for evidence of the vernacular of risk 
management discourse within the coverage across papers. This will be achieved through a simple 
word frequency analysis for representations of risk and of opportunity on either side of the 
referendum debate. 
This will then be coupled with an analysis of the profession or position of the individual who framed 
each theme as a risk or opportunity. In doing so, we will be able to differentiate between the 
position of the participants within the discourse, to see whether they ‘riskify’ issues, or use positive 
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risk-framing depending on their position within the discourse. Which papers preferred what source 
of testimony will also be revealed. 
As part of the literature review, this paper analysed the shift in macroeconomic strategy away from 
a Keynes inspired target of full employment, towards a neoliberal strategy of maintaining price 
stability since the collapse of Bretton-woods. To understand the impact of risk discourse upon 
different social economic groups this paper will take the information reach on the proportion of 
articles couched in the language of risk and opportunity and compare this to the social economic 
profiles of each paper’s readership. In so doing, this paper will be able to see which papers, and thus, 
which social economic groups will be exposed to risk discourse and which are not. 
We can therefore look in the coverage of the Brexit referendum to see whether the techniques of 
risk management are applied when Brexit was prospective, and when it was a certainty. This will 
serve two purposes. First, as confirmation that the techniques of risk management have seeped into 
the way journalists, and the people that they report upon, see the world, therefore corroborating 
risk management’s position as a dominant discourse. This can also be used to see how those outside 
the dominant discourse framed their opposition despite being portrayed as outside of the discourse 
and therefore having a less valid argument. This may help to explain how certain players within the 
leave camp could take on the mantle of outsiders despite their obvious ties to the British 
establishment. Secondly, the debate can be analysed to see how the language of risk management is 
deployed reactively to proportion blame as well as mitigate risk via newspapers because of their vital 
function as a mouthpiece for expert, government and lay. How do different papers treat these 
different groups depending on their editorial position on Brexit? And do their positions adhere to 
the way opponents of a dominant discourse might be expected to be portrayed? What happens 
when a dominant discourse is defeated? And is it is truly defeated, or does it move to accommodate 




Risk Applied Thematically – Critical Analysis 
These risks will then be sorted into the categories of debate identified by the Reuters Institute 
analysis of pre-referendum coverage (Reuters, 2016). These categories have been chosen as they 
have been identified by Reuters as the five main themes of the campaign. Issues such as the 
environment or the NHS, which often come to the fore in general elections were not prevalent in 
this election as borne out by the Reuters study, as well as this paper’s own analysis of the debate. 
The five themes in question are: 
• Business/Economics 




The point of this is to understand if there are areas wherein the techniques for risk management, or 
its opposition - positive risk-framing, aka opportunities - are demonstrated more frequently. A 
greater propensity for risk vernacular in a particular field may be indicative of an arena in which 
practitioners of the dominant discourse are more concerned with mitigating risk, or conversely, if 
positive-risks are framed more in certain areas, then it may indicate the areas in which individuals or 
groups not benefitting as much from the current status-quo are attempting to use the language of 
risk to participate in the dominant discourse to make their arguments. This will help to answer the 
third research question (understanding the tensions between internationalist and local thinking) by 
allowing for an analysis of the way in which these issues are framed as risks or opportunities within 
the local of global context. Approaching it this way allows for an analysis of how journalists and 
politicians used the vernacular of risk management to put forward their cases. for evidence of what 
Hardy and Maguire have labelled the "three models for organising risk (pp.85)." As referred to 
earlier, these consist of prospective risk management (the identification of potential risks that may 
occur and the building of strategies to deal with them), reactive risk management (dealing with risks 
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that have come to pass, whether known or unknown), and retrospective risk management (inquiries 
and procedure building after the risk has been dealt with to ensure it does not come to pass again). 
Coding Procedure 
The articles identified as containing the word ‘Brexit’ at least three times were uploaded into coding 
software called Nvivo. This software allowed for rapid searches of the database so as to begin the 
task of coding. Each article was read and analysed to look for instances of where words relating to 
the five key themes identified above could be found within the same paragraph as the words risk or 
opportunity or various similes of the aforementioned. This produced a database of articles 
containing instance of risk or opportunities concerning business/economics, UK sovereignty, Jobs, 
Regulations and Migration. Each statement containing a keyword could refer to something very 
different than what may initially expected from the keywords searched for. For instance, a 
statement referring to risks in Scotland could be placed under sovereignty or perhaps jobs 
depending upon the sentiment of the statement, or paragraph, as a whole. A statement concerning 
regulation or jobs could pertain to the economic theme as well, but in cases such as this the 
specificity of the statement referring specifically to a particular theme of the economy led to the 
statement being coded in the more precise theme. A full breakdown of how these statements has 
been categorised is available through the Nvivo – the coding software used to create and manage 
this database.  
As well as being able to produce raw data on how each theme was framed within different 
newspapers, this created an easily accessible library of articles which could then be analysed in 
greater detail critically to explore how risk discourse can be evidence both within the wider Brexit 




Considerations and Issues for Methodology 
The partisan nature of Britain’s press is already well documented (Halim, 2004) yet the commercial 
nature of newspapers dictates that on occasion they may shift party allegiance as happened with 
The Sun in 1997. What was different about this referendum, however was the absence of party lines. 
Labour were broadly remain. Most Conservative MPs were too. As were, importantly, the 
government. Papers traditionally supportive of the left found themselves on the same side as the 
Conservative government, whilst traditionally Conservative supporting papers ended up as the most 
vocal supporters of a group of outliers in British political life. But within these broad categorisations 
there are a number of caveats to bear in mind.  
Firstly, a journalist’s position may be in opposition to that of the editorial line of the paper. Even the 
most staunchly one-sided media outlet will allow for opposition views or it may risk accusations of 
undue bias and lose credibility in exchange for dogma. The same is true for the use of risk and 
opportunities within the papers. Whilst a risk can be used to illustrate the danger of losing 
something extant, it can also be used to highlight the danger of an opportunity not seized. It is 
important to bear in mind then, that risks and opportunities can be interpreted in different ways by 
different actors within the discourse. By taking a numeric view on the usage of risk opportunity 
discourse this paper can only really highlight the prevalence of this type of language across the 
referendum campaign. To get in to the subtleties of how this language was used, a further textual 
analysis will have to be undertaken using the quotes highlighted by the initial numerical analysis. 
In focusing so narrowly on the keywords ‘risk’ and ‘opportunity’ as well as a number of synonyms, 
there is also a danger that much of the debate that does not explicitly contain this language could be 
left out of the analysis. This has been conducted so as to specifically look at the use of technocratic 
risk/opportunity analysis within the coverage of the referendum campaign. The initial sample 
returned far too many articles for one researcher to study in any great depth, but it must be born in 
mind that such specificity in terminology can hide some of the other methods in which 
risk/opportunity analysis could be approached. Although not part of the sample, a prime example of 
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this was the BBCs ‘UK and the EU: Better off Out or In’ webpage (BBC News, 26th May, 2016) which 
attempted to give a balance of view on each of the main issues within the referendum debate. The 
stripped-down nature of the for and against responses on this page make for easy and impartial 
readings allowing the reader to make a risk/opportunity analysis with the raw facts. The 
methodology chosen for this study may well miss such straightforward laying out of facts. The 
concern of this paper however lies in the usage of these facts within risk discourse and as such the 
more subjective twisting of these key issues should prove more of an appropriate sample than 
covering the entirety of for/against arguments being made within the papers. 
Sample Definition 
Reuters Institute published an analysis of the paper’s coverage of the referendum shortly after the 
vote called UK Press Coverage of the EU Referendum (Levy, Aslan & Bironzo, 2016). In this they 
undertook a quantitative study to analyse the positions of the papers and well as the issues that 
were focused on the most during the campaign. Due to the sheer length and scale of the campaign, 
this paper will use the Reuters report as a stepping stone to guide analysis of the coverage. Reuters 
identified the degree of partisanship by analysing articles content and marking as biased, those 
which were “determined to be more than 60% in favour of Remain or Leave.” From this, levels of 
partisanship were established with the conclusion that six out of the nine major daily newspapers in 
the UK came out in favour of leave.  
For the purposes of this analysis, one broadsheet and one Tabloid were chosen from each side of the 
debate. The papers in questions were The Telegraph (Broadsheet, leave), The Guardian (Broadsheet, 
remain), The Sun (Tabloid, leave), and The Mirror (Tabloid, remain). The Sun and The Mirror are the 
highest circulated tabloids within each side of the debate so were chosen because of their broad 
markets appeal. In an analysis of tabloids this was deemed useful to gain an understanding of how 
editorial stances are positioned against the need for entertaining content to appeal to a mass-
market audience. The Guardian and The Telegraph were chosen as representative of either side in 
the broadsheet category as the Reuters institute study mentioned earlier, identified them as having 
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the highest proportion of Brexit related articles on either side of the debate (Reuters, pp. 14). The 
Daily Mail was also included because of its position as Britain’s largest mid-market paper and 
because it is often seen as crucial to winning over popular opinion. David Cameron, fighting against 
the paper’s opinion for the first time in his political career, attempted to have the editor Paul Dacre, 
removed and replaced with someone of a more favourable disposition (BBC, 2016).  The readership 
and level of partisanship of the Mail (58% of content being strongly pro-leave) make it worthy 
inclusion in this analysis and helps to make the sample more reflective of the proportion of papers in 
each camp. Reuters analysis indicated that 3 out of the 9 papers in their analysis were pro leave 
indicating the hostile nature of the British press to European issues (Reuters, 2016, pp.17). 
This study remained focused upon UK Daily newspapers rather than on online journalism, television 
or radio, for a number of reasons. Firstly, although Newspapers were now the least used medium 
through which news was consumed (Ofcom 2016), newspapers are still considered agenda setters 
for the rest of the media (especially true of non-newspaper affiliated online content). As Daddow 
writes, this is particularly true when it comes to European matters as broadcasters are much more 
reactive to the stories broken by a largely hostile press, than vice versa.  In the 1975 European 
elections this was not the case and much political campaigning was aimed at influencing 
broadcasters (Daddow, 2012, pp. 1226). Broadcasters in the UK are legally obliged to represent both 
sides of an argument, based on sentiment, rather than scale of opinion. In the case of the BBC, it’s 
publicly funded model is contingent on its freedom from political and market pressures. For this 
paper’s analysis, it was decided not to include public-service broadcasters because they are (in 
theory) not beholden to political or market pressures, and because they do not espouse and 
editorial position on the matter of Brexit during the campaign. As Mark Hampton has noted it is 
through newspapers that countervailing discourses have gained traction despite opposition in the 
mainstream (2009, pp.32), rather than through broadcasters, despite what may be imagined as 
greater institutional hurdles such as ownership interests, printing unions or shared world-views 
amongst professionals. It could however be argued that it would be fruitful to include them in the 
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analysis to understand whether the dominant discourse of risk was contingent on political or market 
pressures, or whether it is still used outside of these pressures.  
Newspapers are still considered by many to be the seat of professionalism in the industry and are 
still responsible for much investigative journalism. Although there are relationships between the 
newspaper industry and the political class, newspapers have largely retained their editorial 
independence. The partisan nature of many newspapers also allows for a like-for-like examination of 
how the same medium can be used to communicate very different points of view. 
In focusing this paper’s sample on daily newspapers in the UK, this paper aims to look at how the 
culture of news production in the UK feeds into, or perpetuates the dominant discourse of risk. As 
with all professions, journalism in the UK has its own discourse which is influenced, as James Curran 
writes by “institutional arrangements of news media – influencing how they are financed and 
managed, their cultures and organisational goals.” (Curran, J. pp.39). It is felt, that unlike in 
broadcast journalism, which according to liberal narratives (as well as legislature), must maintain a 
degree of impartiality, newspaper journalism in the UK contains a greater coverage of differing 
institutional arrangements – whether this be a fact of ownership, readership demographics, or 
revenue streams, than broadcast journalism. In distinction to the older liberal narrative of journalism 
acting as the fourth estate, within the UK market pressures have either, in the liberal understanding, 
led to a greater diversity of opinion through democratisation of opinion, or in the more radical 
narrative, done the opposite, through increased concentration of ownership and creation of barriers 
to opposition viewpoints.  
If we are to take the liberal narrative of journalism acting as the fourth estate, then we can 
understand the challenging of any dominant discourse, such as risk, to be a result of journalism 
demonstrating a plurality of viewpoints and acting as a mouthpiece for democratic society. On the 
other hand, it can be argued through a more radical reading, that should the plurality of opinion still 
be couched in the langue of the risk discourse, then actors are still playing within the discourse, and, 
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as discussed in an earlier section, this is perhaps another example of the discourse integrating and 
acknowledging arguments against it retrospectively, to be later integrated into the discourse, much 
as risk is organised retrospectively. Critical voices are either framed as outsiders, outside the 
language of the discourse, or couched within the language of the discourse so as to be legitimated 
by that very language. In choosing two tabloid papers, and two broadsheet papers editorially aligned 
to either camp, we can look at the validity of either of these readings. Broadsheet papers are more 
aligned to the ideals of journalistic professional practice and are held up as exemplars of the fourth 
estate ideal of a liberal narrative of media, whilst having a broad sample of papers from either end 
of the market should represent a plurality of opinion in the market. Similarly, the market driven 
understanding of opinion drives for the inclusion of the highest selling papers (The Sun and Daily 
Mail) as these therefore are the papers with the most similarity of views to the media buying public. 
If we were to look at the sample of newspapers through the more radical lens, we could view the 
sample through proprietors and the interests they may seek to forward. The Telegraph is owned by 
the Barclay Brothers, The Sun by Rupert Murdoch’s News UK, and the Daily Mail by Viscount 
Rothermere. These three proprietors between them own 4 of the UKs leasing newspapers and the 
highest circulating tabloid, broadsheet and mid-market papers. They have also been seen a 
politically active and, especially in the case of Rupert Murdoch understood as influential to the 
political cycle of UK life. The fact that all three of these proprietors’ own papers that came out in 
favour of leaving the EU (although The Mail on Sunday was in favour of remain) is of interest. These 
papers have tended to support the Conservative party in the past but have campaigned against 
Europe in the past. Whilst the dominant discourse of economics professionals was allied with remain 
suggesting that a purely market-led understanding of these papers editorial lines does not quite ally 
with reality. 
The dates chosen for analysis were June 8-15th 2016 and Jun 24 - Jul 1st 2016. The election itself took 
place on June 23rd. This gives the sample scope to analyse how risk was portrayed on either side of 
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the referendum date. The pre-referendum sample dates were chosen so as to avoid coverage of the 
murder of Jo Cox and the resultant pause in campaigning that followed. It was felt that for the 
purposes of this analysis, the need for continued newspaper coverage of speeches and events 
directly relating to the Brexit debate, rather than that of the death of an MP resulting from this 
debate, would prove more fruitful for analysis. In terms of the key research questions, these dates 
either side of the referendum allows for an analysis of how the result of the referendum were 
interpreted between expert and lay as positioned by risk discourse. Analysing coverage from before 
and after the referendum will allow for analysis of how players within the risk discourse may have 
felt alienated by the results when prior to the referendum it could be argued that those outside the 
discourse would have felt so. The sample composition in terms of which newspapers were chosen 
will help to answer the third research question on how the UK newspaper industry reflects the 
tension between sovereign state and internationalist thinking by comparing the more 
internationalist mindset of broadsheets, against the more locally-focused tabloid.  
All articles were gathered from the Nexus online resource. Whilst this enabled for quick collection 
and search of all papers within these dates there are a few factors consider when comparing Nexus 
articles to reading the paper’s themselves. A filter was added to the Nexus search to ensure that all 
articles gathered were from the print version of the papers rather than from online sources to 
ensure comparability. The nexus itself produces text only versions of the articles in question which 
means there is little ability to analyse things like positioning within the paper, choice of imagery to 
accompany articles, or quotes that are picked out and positioned in larger typeface for impact. This 
information can prove very useful when trying to analyse how the editorial stance of a paper can be 
used to enhance or decrease the message of a given article within the context of the print edition. 
For instance, a piece that goes against the general editorial stance may be given a position towards 
the centre of the paper, or not given an accompanying picture to de-emphasise its message. 
Conversely, articles that agree with a paper’s editorial stance may be given greater prominence. 
Articles may also be given headlines that stray from the content of the piece, or certain elements 
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may be highlighted above others that emphasise key elements of the piece that may be at odds with 
the broader message. Although this would have been useful for this analysis, the text version 
supplied by the Nexus was deemed sufficient as it would be more manageable to code within Nvivo, 





Initial Analysis - Prevalence of Risk and Opportunity Language 
All articles were accessed using the Nexus database through an initial search for any articles 
containing the word “Brexit” three times or more. As the referendum was such a topic of debate, 
three or more references was deemed necessary to sift through the sheer volume of articles over 
fourteen days and to show a clear focus of the article on the subject of Brexit. In total, the database 
(after removing duplicates and articles with very high similarity) returned 422 articles from June 8-15 
and 1417 from Jun 24th to Jul 1st broken down by publication as follows: 
JUN 8 – 15 PUBLICATION ARTICLES 
GUARDIAN 164 
TELEGRAPH 92 
THE SUN 88 
THE MAIL 47 
THE MIRROR 33 
TOTAL 422 





JUN 24 – JUL 1 PUBLICATION ARTICLES 
GUARDIAN 863 
TELEGRAPH 167 
THE SUN 165 
THE MAIL 141 
THE MIRROR 81 
TOTAL 1417 
Table 3: Articles published between Jun 24 – Jul 1 containing the word ‘Brexit’ 3 or more times 
Across both samples The Guardian contained a significantly higher number of articles than any other 
paper perhaps reflecting its status as a global media outlet with operations across the world. It may 
also be reflective of the amount of their content that is of a political bent in comparison especially to 
the tabloid press. This would not explain the discrepancy between The Guardian and The Telegraph, 
which generally features a similarly high amount of political coverage. This is especially true of the 
post-referendum coverage in which The Guardian’s content contains more than double the amount 
of significant references than the other papers combined. A possible explanation for this could be 
that the paper and its target audience were on the losing side of the referendum which was seen as 
something of a proxy for many liberal values beyond belonging to the European Union. This is 
broadly indicative of much of the soul searching that characterized the media after the referendum. 
Because of this, much of the content across the Guardian newspaper, including style, lifestyle and 
sport, contained a high degree of politicized content when compared to the other major 
newspapers. Aside from this oddity the number of articles seem to confirm the prominence of 
political content in broadsheet journalism verses tabloid journalism considering their respective 
target audiences. 
For an understanding of how the language of risk and its correlate opportunity was employed during 
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and after the referendum these articles were then subjected to a search for every mention of the 
word ‘risk’ or ‘opportunity’ in these articles as well as similes such as ‘danger’ or ‘prospect’. This 
search also included stemmed version of the words such as ‘opportunities’ or ‘risky’ A criticism of 
this method could be that the word risk itself does not necessarily infer the language of risk 
management, but it is highly suggestive of it and allows for the fact that coverage in Tabloid press 
may not be couched in the professional language employed by broadsheets. The discourse itself can 
still be present and utilized for the layman and this technique allows for a closer study of how 
terminology and phrasing is tempered to reflect the concerns of the dominant discourse to those 
who do not speak the technicalities of its language. 
JUN 8 – 15 
PUBLICATIONS 
RISK % OF TOTAL OPPORTUNITY % OF TOTAL 
GUARDIAN 66 40.2 24 14.6 
TELEGRAPH 31 33.7 7 7.6 
THE SUN 12 13.6 7 8 
THE MAIL 13 27.7 7 14.9 
THE MIRROR 9 27.3 1 3 
TOTAL 131 31 46 10.9 






JUN 24 – JUL 1 
PUBLICATIONS 
RISK % OF TOTAL OPPORTUNITY % OF TOTAL 
GUARDIAN 151 17.5 125 14.5 
TELEGRAPH 38 22.75 35 20.1 
THE SUN 10 6 24 14.5 
THE MAIL 22 15.6 27 19.1 
THE MIRROR 4 5 7 8.6 
TOTAL 225 15.9 218 15.4 
Table 5: Proportion of total articles containing risk/opportunity language post-referendum 
 
Any suggestions here are predicated with the thought that the appearance of the word risk or 
opportunity within an article does not indicate the presence of the technicalities of a dominant 
discourse. It does however indicate framing of an issue and in this respect the findings above prove 
intriguing. The level of financial markets coverage in the Telegraph and The Guardian may explain 
the high levels of articles containing risk language due to their preponderance in such discourse. Risk 
is the language of economics after all. The London-centric nature of the Guardian may explain the 
level of professionalized discourse employed. Notions of risk seem to be the predominant method of 
framing in the pre-referendum coverage with the notable exception of The Sun. Reasons for this will 
be discussed in the next breakdown. The Guardian frames 40.2% of its coverage in terms of risk with 
14.6% of the articles employing language of opportunity. Other papers emphasise risk to a far 
greater extent. One possible reason for this is that so much of the British political and commercial 
establishment were on the side of the Remain campaign whilst relatively few 'outsiders' were 
viewed as legitimate quotable sources.  
The information above provides a brief, though very de-contextualised snapshot of how the debate 
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was framed in terms of risk and opportunity. As Beck has noted, risk discourse is often the domain of 
‘experts’ similarly to how Fairclough and Chouliaraki described discourse as the domain of 
professionals (Fairclough & Chouliaraki,  1999). The next section aims to analyse the position of the 
participants of the discourse in a professional sense to gain an understanding of how their position 
may affect their utilisation of the language of risk and opportunity, as well as to understand how 
journalists, from their own particular publications professional sphere, may choose to utilise risk 
discourse, or give precedence to professionals from certain positions within the discourse. 
 
Participants in the Discourse 
Any participants in the dominant discourse are able to frame themselves as participants by 
becoming the proprietors - or 'experts' - of knowledge in their field. As such, they are the first people 
turned to by commentators and analysts for an understanding of what is happening. To understand 
the means in which the remain campaign were able to so dominate discourse in the run up to the 
campaign, it is well worth analysing the sources turned to, by the UK media, for an understanding of 





PRE-VOTE JUN 8-15 MAIL GUARDIAN TELEGRAPH SUN MIRROR 
RISK/OPPORTUNITY R O R O R O R O R O 
CITY VOICE   2 1 5 2   1  
BUSINESS 1 1 2  2    1  
CONSERVATIVE POLITICIAN 2 1 3  3 2 3    
BRITISH CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE 
          
FOREIGN POLITICIAN   2        
TRADE UNION       1    
HIGHER EDUCATION 1    1  1  3  
LABOUR POLITICIAN  1 5     1   
HOUSING INDUSTRY           
FREE MARKET THINK TANK    1       
CIVILIAN  1 2        
PRO-BUSINESS GROUP          1 
LEAVE CAMPAIGNER  1 1  2  1   1 
DEVOLVED POLITICIAN   2        
BANK OF ENGLAND 1          
IFIS         1  
REMAIN CAMPAIGNER 1  2    1  3  
POLICE/ARMY   1        
TOTAL 6 5 23 2 13 4 7 1 9 2 
Table 8: Sources of quotes across the 5 papers pre-referendum 
 
As this chart demonstrates, there was a weight of 'expert' opinion for the risks of Brexit which came 
from a variety of different professional and political backgrounds in the run up to the vote. Across 
the broadsheets, the majority of participants within the discourse of risk and opportunity 
surrounding the Brexit campaign, came from City Voices - those who work in the financial industries 
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in London - Conservative politicians and business representatives outside of financial services, as 
well as leave and remain campaigners who are not MPs. Considering the economic propensity of 
arguments of risk and opportunity within the context of Brexit, this is in some ways not surprising as 
these professions/positions are generally the first port of call for any political opinion. What is 
surprising however is the lack of opinion provided by Labour politicians (possibly due to the 
confused nature of the party coming into the referendum), and the lack of opinion from ordinary 
members of the public. Whilst ordinary members of the public could be seen as lay, Labour 
politicians are certainly not. What few comments there are from the public are concerned with the 
issue which dominated opinion polls, but not that of newspaper commentary. The Mail has one 
member of the public with a telling quote: 
" Resident Darren Lock, a bricklayer, said: They've taken our jobs from us, and it's our culture, it's 
where we were brought up and where we belong. If you're born in Britain, you know, you should be 
here. This vote is a gamble, but I still think we've got to go out (Ellicott, 2016).' 
This quote comes from one of the few fact-finding, boots on the ground, style articles that were 
commissioned pre-election. The difference between the colloquialisms and inarticulacy of this quote 
- with the reasoned arguments of those participants of the dominant discourse - is especially stark. 
Whilst the dominant discourse of risk and opportunity regarding the Brexit referendum was played 
out in newspapers by participants of the discourse over economic decisions, the discussions 
amongst lays has been more firmly rooted in discussions of immigration and identity. Reuters study 
confirms this with a much higher percentage of Brexit articles concerning immigration amongst 
tabloid papers (Reuters, 2016, pp.21). This study unearthed a lack of risk/opportunity analysis in the 
tabloid papers indicating that debates aimed at a lay audience took place without statistics. 
Traditional political players were seen to avoid commenting on migration due to the difficulties of 
language associated with them. It could be argued that the participation in economic risk 
opportunity commentary was but a facet of the leave campaigns message - something of a necessity 
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to be seen as a legitimate participant in the discourse. When rather, there key message of anti-
immigration and sovereignty, were commented on to a much lesser degree in these official channels 
of the dominant discourse, but were much more effective at reaching voters on a personal level as 
they themselves are not represented in the dominant discourse of economics. As Claire Elcott writes 
in the Daily Mail: 
‘[V]oters see immigration at the centre of the argument, whichever way they lean personally. 
"Immigration, that's what everyone's thinking about, whether they say so or not," said one man in 
Knowsley. "Immigration is the first thing that seems to get mentioned. I saw it on the news, the 
radio, " said one of the Brighton women’ (Ellicott, 2016) 
As we will see shortly, Immigration was not a topic discussed in terms of risk or opportunity 
according to the findings of this study. It could be that the emotional nature of the arguments for 
and against immigration are difficult to argue against with statistics, or that participants of risk 
discourse held differing views on immigration, seeing it as a net-benefit, rather than a threat. 
The numbers in the tables above only include risks or opportunities that were attributable to clear 
sources used by journalists. Any risks or opportunities that were not included in this table are 
therefore the voices of the various journalists of commentators. A clear takeaway from these tables 
is the lack of voices from any non-business group bar trade unions, occasional civilians and certain 
Labour MPs. What can we infer from this is that the language of risk is the language of a dominant 
discourse, and in particular the language of economics. In the pre-Brexit referendum coverage, the 
majority of risks are espoused by politicians on either side. Due to their positions of prominence in 
the debate this makes sense as a large proportion of the media coverage at this time focused on the 
respective leave and remain campaigns which were led by cross-party coalitions of politicians. 
Opportunities were proffered by a number of conservative politicians and some business leaders. 
These are opportunities exclusively within the economic sphere or couched in the language of 
economics presenting a subversion of the dominant discourse of risk and uncertainty.  
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POST-VOTE JUN 24-JUL 1 MAIL GUARDIAN TELEGRAPH SUN MIRROR 
RISK/OPPORTUNITY R O R O R O R O R O 
CITY VOICE 2 5 8  4 3     
BUSINESS 2 6 2 1 2 5     
CONSERVATIVE POLITICIAN 1 2 1  1 5     
BRITISH CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE 
 2         
FOREIGN POLITICIAN 1 1  1 1      
TRADE UNION    3       
HIGHER EDUCATION   1 3       
LABOUR POLITICIAN  1 1 2 1 1  1   
HOUSING INDUSTRY  1  3 1      
FREE MARKET THINK TANK    1       
CIVILIAN    3  1     
PRO-BUSINESS GROUP    1 1 1   1  
LEAVE CAMPAIGNER      1     
DEVOLVED POLITICIAN    2  1     
BANK OF ENGLAND           
IFIS     1      
REMAIN CAMPAIGNER     1      
POLICE/ARMY           
TOTAL 6 18 13 20 13 18 0 1 1 0 
Table 9: Sources of quotes across the 5 papers pre-referendum 
 
The Graph above follows the same methodology as before but focuses on risks or opportunities to 
be found in leaving the European Union in the coverage in the week after the referendum debate. As 
demonstrated in the overall tone of the coverage in earlier analysis, we can see that there is a 
significant shift across all papers towards voices espousing positive news to the outcome of the vote. 
The shift across the Guardian newspaper is particularly evident going from a 23:2 risk/opportunity 
91 
 
focus, to a 13:20. There are of course mitigating factors for this shift: the outcome of the voter 
produced winners who took up more coverage and were somewhat more newsworthy at the time, 
examples of opportunities could be used as a salve through which to heal the burn of those on the 
losing side of the vote, and even those who voted to remain in the UK may see the greater economic 
position of the UK as best being served by putting a positive spin on the outcome.  There is evidence 
again of a bias in the selection of the voice of experts by newspapers towards those in pro-business 
positions, politicians, and those with most fluency in the dialogue of this discourse of risk and 
opportunity played out in the those newspapers with the higher proportion of ABC1 readers. We see 
again that the coverage of risk opportunity dialogue is almost entirely missing from the coverage of 
The Sun and the Daily Mirror, with only one Labour politician and one pro-business group 
contributing to this discourse. There is also a marked increase in the contribution put forward by 
housing associations and trade unions. The timing of their contributions may reflect on the one hand 
the need to ascertain what the lay of the land is likely to be like post-vote, but could also speak 
towards a certain opportunism as the rules of politics as normal were somewhat upended after the 
vote. Perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, the appetite for risk/opportunity analysis across papers 
does not seem to be have been diminished post-vote despite the skew towards focusing on the 
opportunities of Brexit. Instead, many of the same arguments that dominated the press in the 
follow-up to the vote now take place again but in the context of the inevitability of the Brexit vote. 
This provides some evidence towards a disconnect of dialogues taking place. Despite these 
arguments not having been seen by a large proportion of those who voted for to leave the European 
Union, their continuation is evident. Now it is never the place of opposition to meekly roll over and 
accept defeat, particularly in the emotional environment that followed the vote, but the manner in 
which the same arguments were repeated ad nauseum, as if the certitude of opinion would convince 




Risk discourse exposure in Social Economics Groups 
 
Newspapers are of course commercial entities and as such they are aligned to the demographics of 
their readerships. In the section above we analysed what kind of professionals were given positions 
within the risk discourse. It was noted that Tabloid papers on the whole had less impetus placed 
upon risk opportunity language. In the table below this further explored by comparing data pulled 
from the national readership survey, to the Reuters analysis of proportion of Brexit related articles in 
their study: 
 
  TOTAL ABC1 
READERSHIP% 
C2DE READERSHIP % PROPORTION OF 
BREXIT R/O 
ARTICLES 
DAILY NEWSPAPERS - 6 
DAY AIR  
        
          
  THE SUN              3486 31.35% 68.67% 20.95% 
  DAILY MAIL           3052 62.65% 37.35% 36.70% 
  DAILY 
MIRROR/RECORD 
1926 34.27% 65.68% 18.42% 
  THE DAILY TELEGRAPH  1101 86.38% 13.62% 42.86% 
  THE GUARDIAN         886 84.76% 15.24% 35.64% 
      Correlation between 




      Correlation between 




Table 7: Correlation between risk and opportunity language prevalence in papers and ABC1 readership 
 
As is to be expected, Broadsheet papers such as the Telegraph and The Guardian have a readership 
heavily weighted towards the ABC1 social categories who are more likely to work in professional 
industries, own property and be highly educated. The Daily Mail has a somewhat more evenly 
distributed readership with a 3/2 split amongst ABC1 and C2DE sections of the population perhaps 
reflecting its vastly higher readership and position as mid-market tabloid rather than true 
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broadsheet. The Sun and the Daily Mirror each have a much higher proportion of their readership 
within the C2DE category as reflected in their positions as Tabloids. In the graph below, the 
proportion of readership in each economic segment has been compared to the proportion of total 
articles written during the two time periods in this study which included risk/opportunity language. 
A Simple correlation analysis shows how these differing target audiences correlated with the 
prevalence of risk/opportunity discourse within each newspaper. 
This table clearly demonstrates that there is a very strong positive correlation between the 
proportion of ABC1 readers a newspaper has, and the amount that its articles feature discussion 
around the risks and benefits of Brexit. On the other hand, we have an equally strong correlation 
demonstrating that the more C2DE readers a paper has, the less participation in this risk/benefit 
discourse there will be. It seems then, that the discourse of risk is highly professionalised, in that 
readers, and the journalists who write for papers aimed at a less professional audience tend not to 
utilise the language of risk to the same degree. This seems to lend support to the fact that whilst 
immigration was often noted as the top concern amongst Brexit supporters, the use of 
risk/opportunity language - particularly in support of the economic ramification of Brexit was not 
read, or even present, as much amongst papers with a strong C2DE readership. Many commentators 
saw the rise of UKIP as primarily the outcome of disaffection amongst Conservative voters seeking 
severance from the EU and a return to self-governance. UKIP leader Nigel Farage said in response to 
this that "It's Fleet Street. This is all Fleet Street. This is their obsession and they can't get out of it. 
But the numbers are perfectly clear. There is now a huge class dimension to the UKIP vote (Ford & 
Goodwin, 2014, pp.146)." 
As we can see from the tables above, there appears to be very little participation in the dominant 
discourse of risk and opportunity amongst those not in ABC1 segmentation or in professional 
classes. This can go some way to explaining the disconnect felt amongst C2DE voters and the tactics 
of the remain campaign seeing as if there is no representation of their social class in the papers, and 
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if the papers that they do read do not choose to print as much of the dominant discourse of risk and 
opportunity, then the somewhat technocratic argument that the leave campaign was attempting to 
use is not going to have as much of an impact amongst these voters. In fact, the bubble of economic 
and risk opportunity discussion that has taken place across the UK national newspapers may not 
reflect the concerns of the C2DE or shrinking working classes that voted for Brexit. These are the 
people after all, who have felt the full impact of globalisation upon their careers and income over 
the past 30 years of neoliberal economic policy. Editors of the newspapers that they do choose to 
read do not seem to print technocratic arguments in the same volume as the broadsheets. The 
exception being the Daily Mail which was the most vociferously pro-Brexit paper during the 
campaign. In short – C2DE readers are not experiencing the same political discourse as their fellow 
ABC1 countrymen.  
 
Risk and Opportunities deployed thematically 
 
The next stage is to analyse the language of the risks and opportunities employed by papers within 
the broad categories identified by the Reuters analysis mentioned above.  Using word frequency 
analysis of all the articles identified featuring the words 'risk' or 'opportunity', coding was 
undertaken to see which of the themes identified in the Reuters study of Brexit coverage each 
instance referred to. Each paper’s use of language in framing these themes in risk or opportunity 
language will then be analysed critically to understand their position within the discourse of risk, and 
particularly at newspaper’s key position within the discourse as framers of risk (Cottle, 2010). This 
ability to frame risk is important as it is through the framing and management of unknowns, such as 
they potential effects a vote to leave may have on the UK, that positions of power are maintained 
within the discourse. As discussed earlier (see Risk Discourse section), the reflexive nature of the 
problems society encounters today cause the management of risk to be of paramount importance as 
each new reflexive risk is borne directly out of the choices and decisions made by that society. 
95 
 
Unawareness of risk is potentially damaging for participants of the discourse as it calls into question 
their authority.  
Analysing representations of risk or opportunity within the newspaper coverage of the referendum 
will help us to answer the three key questions of this paper by examining how lay and expert are 
portrayed (or ignored), examining how those outside the discourse (particularly in the post-
referendum coverage) are alienated by the discourse, and in examining the tensions between 
national and internationalist thinking. Given the importance of international globalised events upon 
themes such as the economy and jobs, the positioning of risks or opportunities as being national or 
extra-national opens room for an interrogation of whether journalists and newspapers themselves 
are participants of risk discourse aware of the globalised nature of risk society, or more 




The Guardian was the most partisan of any paper when it came to balancing the risks and 
opportunities Brexit may present by a factor of 11-1. This can be attributed to a number of causes; 
the London-centric nature of the paper, its global position as a liberal left-leaning paper, and its 
nature as a broadsheet paper. Although this study looked at the print output of the Guardian it must 
be remembered that much of their print journalism is also used on the Guardian website which has a 
huge following amongst youth voters due to the free access; the majority of whom voted to remain.  
What is very clear from this analysis is that the uncertainties arising from a leave vote in the Brexit 
campaign were framed in the language of risk across all papers. Broadsheets, such as The Guardian 
and Telegraph feature particularly heavy usage of the terminology of risk management in their 
analysis of the potential issues arising from a leave vote. It is worth noting however that risk 
language was also employed to emphasise the need to leave the European Union by many pro-leave 
papers. Not leaving the European Union was, for them, as great a risk as the uncertainties of Brexit 
96 
 
Britain were for the remain papers. As Althaus has noted, risk discourse is the management and 
application of knowledge to identified uncertainties. In refuting an identified risk as an actual 
opportunity, commentators who disagree with the discourses categorisation of uncertainties as risk, 
can utilise the application of knowledge to their own ends allowing ingress into the discourse whilst 
simultaneously calling into question the application of knowledge by those within the discourse 
(Althaus, 2005, pp.581). 
 As may be expected, the most vociferously pro-leave papers- The Sun and The Mail - contained a 
great deal more references to the opportunities that may arise from leaving Europe. In fact, of all 
the papers, these two may seem the most balanced in terms of maintaining the standards of 
objective journalism which usually requires quotes, or arguments, from both sides to be considered 
of a standard for consumption. Within an election or vote cycle the party lines that most of the UK 
press takes does seem to be to the detriment of this objectivity.   
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JUN 8-15 PUBLICATION RISK OPPORTUNITY 
GUARDIAN Business/Economics 20 2 
UK Sovereignty 6 0 
Jobs 6 0 
Regulations 1 1 
Migration 11 Total: 44 0 Total: 3 
TELEGRAPH Business/Economics 15 5 
UK Sovereignty 6 1 
Jobs 0 0 
Regulations 0 1 
Migration 1 Total: 22 0 Total: 7 
THE SUN Business/Economics 3 0 
UK Sovereignty 1 0 
Jobs 0 0 
Regulations 0 0 
Migration 1 Total: 5 1 Total: 5 
THE MAIL Business/Economics 11 2 
UK Sovereignty 0 3 
Jobs 0 1 
Regulations 0 0 
Migration 2 Total: 13 4 Total: 10 
THE MIRROR Business/Economics 4 1 
UK Sovereignty 2 0 
Jobs 3 0 
Regulations 0 0 
Migration 1 Total: 10 0 Total: 1 







Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 20 2 
Telegraph 15 5 
The Sun 3 0 
The Mail 11 2 
The Mirror 4 1 
 
Table 11: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Business/Economics Pre-referendum 
 
There is something of a disparaging nature to the remainer’s dream of the UK standing in its own 
two feet in the economic commentary of the Guardian's writing: "It is one of the few industries 
where London is in the lead globally “ writes one analysis of Britain’s’ position as global economic 
power (Pratley, 2016)." “The aircraft engine maker told employees that Brexit would put the 
company's future investment plans in the UK at risk and hand its American rivals a competitive 
advantage (Monaghan, 2016)" remark two business leaders. The message here is that within the 
competitive environs of globalisation, any move to move out of the EU would force multinational 
organisations to reconsider their use of the UK across production lines. Why bother with the 
complexity of Brexit when there are many other territories that will be more than willing to open 
their borders to our trade, or to take on the ‘golden straight-jacket’ of globalisation? Indeed, "When 
the leavers speak of "taking control", they mean casting off from our continental harbour into the 
swell of unregulated global markets (Behr, 2016)" - markets that thrive on the levels of competition 
that the EU has tried to mitigate. There is a realism to these quotes in as much as there is an 
admission of fealty to the golden-straightjacket of globalisation. The industries represented above 
have done well out of the global opportunities offered as part of membership to the UK and are 
keenly aware of the kinds of headaches a change in circumstances would cause their businesses. 
99 
 
Across a global business class, it makes sense to swim with the tide, particularly when you are, as 
The Guardian views it, one of the smaller fish. 
Broadly supportive of leave, The Telegraph places a greater emphasis on technical economic 
reporting than the Guardian, perhaps reflective of its status as a paid-for broadsheet, rather than an 
open access online publication. The Telegraph's split between framing the debate in risks and 
opportunities is not as partisan as the Guardian, but still leans heavily upon the side of risks to the 
UK's economic situation, perhaps reflective of the broad admission of the expert economic 
consensus of the uncertainties a vote to leave would entail. In comparison to the Guardian's 
coverage, the Telegraph does not shy away from printing technical indices and figures at length to 
support its arguments which also tend to focus less on the predictions of campaigners on either side, 
and more on what and how markets are reacting to the vote, and what this indicates at a macro 
level. Across the coverage, there is a tendency to place the Brexit debate and its consequences 
squarely in the "the short to medium term (Cunningham, 2016)." The sober figure led commentary 
in the paper is contested by more hyperbolic language. In Tara Cunningham and Marion Daker's 
looks at the fluctuating FTSE 100 "volatility", "fears," "dives" and "freefall" are placed within the 
context of a previously buoyant FTSE and a strong underlying UK economic outlook reflected in the 
move by investors towards safe-havens such as UK bonds. Across the coverage lies the refrain that 
the "markets have priced in volatility (Evans-Pritchard, 2016)" even with the potential for house 
price falls and investment to stagnate. Unlike the Guardian's coverage of the economic 
consequences which seems often to veer towards the hysteric - perhaps reflecting the general sense 
of deflation across the remain campaign at this point of the campaign - the Telegraph is identifying 
the risks and identifying that the market has realised these issues and is handling it appropriately, or 
at least as it would be expected to. The only reference to risks not placed within the context of facts 
and figures comes from a feature by British Olympian Ben Ainslie who writes that: 
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"These are all incredibly successful businessmen who are out there in the global market place; they 
understand the economics much better than the rest of us and, frankly, much more clearly than any 
politician. Surely we should take their opinions seriously? (Ainslie, 2016)" 
There is a sense that Ainslie here is meant to play the everyman - just about to bring a new "baby in 
to the world", realising that "even the experts can't really answer the key question." Within the 
context of risk discourse, his position is that of risk-bearer (Hardy & Maguire, 2015, pp.10) seeking 
advice from risk-assessors and other arbiters of accepted knowledge within the discourse. As such 
he purports the position that it is not worth the risk. Ainslie is taking advice from experts on a 
decision that he doesn't believe they really know the answer, whilst the Telegraph's other coverage 
does not decisively weigh in on the benefits of leaving, but instead tries to soberly remind us that 
markets are aware of the many possible permutations and are not panicking. For a sailor like Ainslie, 
perhaps a sense of slack-water in the markets would prove a useful analogy. 
 
Risks are posited with facts and figures in the Telegraph; the opportunities that may arise from 
Brexit are conspicuous from their absence of technical data. The paper's financial editor Allister 
Heath writes a piece wherein he talks about Brexit as an opportunity to boost free-trade thanks to 
the "supreme anxiety” (Heath, 2016) caused amongst European exporting manufacturers. This is as 
much an opportunity to reform the eurozone as it is the reform the UK in The Telegraph. Much like 
Varoufakis and Blyth who see the Eurozone as a modern-day gold standard, The Telegraph views the 
collapse of the eurozone as an inevitability which it is better that the UK extricate itself from as soon 
as possible (Daddow, 2012, pp.1225). This again reflects the paper's macro-economic stance, for 
whilst manufacturers are painted as concerned with their international supply lines and maintaining 
the low-levels of bureaucracy that the customs union provides, The editorial team at the Telegraph 
see these as contingent upon the continuation of the European Union whilst "the ‘experts’ who keep 
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telling us that Brexit means economic disintegration are hopelessly wrong about all of this.(Heath, 
2016) " It is the politicians of Europe that are stymieing the free market.  
Despite the perception of the Daily Mail chief Paul Dacre as cheerleader for Brexit, the paper’s own 
commentary leaned towards the risks of Brexit, rather than the opportunities on offer. What is 
striking about their commentary however is that these risks are not posited by the journalists 
themselves - instead they are included as counters to the editorial stance of the paper. Mark Carney, 
Mrs Cameron, George Osbourne and several high-level businessmen are quoted as having warned of 
the economic risks and are then harangued in the next sentence. Carney is set to "infuriate 
eurosceptics (Duncan, 2016)" when he warns of the dangers of quitting the eurozone because of 
"doom-laden" warning outside of his remit as governor. Osborne and Cameron are also accused of 
"doom-mongering (Slack, 2016)" and of turning the Treasury into a "pro-Brussels propaganda 
machine." Perhaps due to the overwhelming weight of opinion from experts on the side of remain, 
the Daily Mail spends more time questioning whether the positions of power these experts occupy 
are being abused for the cause of voting remain. Coupled with character assassination such as the 
questions of whether the boss of BT "should concentrate on improving BT (Slack & Martin, 2016)" 
rather than on writing a pro-remain letter to his 80,000 employees. There is something in the 
freedom that the Daily Mail's positioning as a middle-market tabloid that allows the paper to 
participate in the cut and thrust of debate without being hamstrung by the broadsheet paper's 
pretence at objectivity. When a debate is around uncertainties that prior data and hard evidence 
cannot be provided easily for, then wit, defamation and disparagement can provide the 
entertainment that allow for easy digestion of difficult to understand topics. In risk discourse, 
management of the perception of risk is of paramount importance and by taking this questioning 
stance, the Daily Mail is able to achieve its editorial aims of ensuring Brexit takes place, whilst 
simultaneously offering both sides of the argument. In questioning the classifications of 
uncertainties of risk, the paper can question the discourse as a whole and thus the expert opinion of 
those on the remain side of the debate. 
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The final tabloids of this study reflect the tactics of their ideologically aligned broadsheets. The Sun 
takes the same line as the Telegraph when discussing risks - i.e. placing them within a larger macro 
context so as to minimise the hyperbolic impact of considering the trends in the short term. The 
difference between the two lies in the Sun's avoidance of the exact figures that the Telegraph 
employs. Instead of figures on how gilt yields have moved across Europe, The Sun takes the stance 
that the UKs gilt yield having fallen to indicate that "Project Fear is not working (The Sun, 2016)." In 
avoiding commentary on statistics the paper is able to keep commentary outside of risk discourse so 
as to better focus on the emotive arguments for Brexit. The earlier analysis of the prevalence of risk 
discourse correlated against each paper’s demographics, further backs this more emotive emphasis. 
The tone of politicians also differs from Broadsheet to Tabloid. In an interview with George Osborne 
attempts to utilise the same kind of brotherly imagery that the Leave camp and the Daily Mail 
employed. The following two quotes are from the same article, but reworked for the English and 
Scottish national dailies: 
"We've been through the dark night together and you can see the sunrise as the economy gets 
stronger, with more people in work. Why would we want to turn back? Why would we go back into 
the darkness? (Wooding, 2016)" 
"This would be Britain voluntarily choosing to be poorer." He highlighted predictions by independent 
experts that Brexit would leave a black hole in public finances of up to £40billion. He said: "Warnings 
are coming thick and fast, and you should definitely be aware of them before you vote." (English 
Edition) 
The Scottish edition focuses on camaraderie, in a sense of pulling together, perhaps playing on the 
recent success of the Scottish better together campaign. The English version on the other hand 
reverts to statistics, to a sense of the foolishness of a vote to leave. The Sun, although traditionally 
right-leaning, is a paper that changes its allegiances along with its audience’s preferences and this 
chameleon like tendency can be seen on display here. North of the border, polls indicate a strong 
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preference for remain, so as such the imagery utilised by the paper encourages camaraderie and 
expands the headline to include a reference to little Englander's. In the English edition, Osborne is 
presented as haughty and potentially indifferent to the greater burden shouldered by others 
 
UK Sovereignty 
Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 6 0 
Telegraph 6 1 
The Sun 1 0 
The Mail 0 3 
The Mirror 2 0 
 
Table 12: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning UK Sovereignty Pre-referendum 
 
When discussing issues relating to the sovereignty argument of the referendum campaign the 
Guardian offers a similarly disparaging view as to the benefits of possibilities of this argument. "'Take 
back control (Behr, 2016)'" is enclosed in single quotations indicating ridicule. In a pre-referendum 
survey "many of the participants felt frustrated or not well-informed enough to make a choice 
(Stewart & Asthana, 2016)" on the position of sovereignty. It was acknowledged that the 
repatriation of certain areas of law-making could well come at the expense of complete loss of 
control over others, particularly if access to the common market were to be continued. The 
condescension to leave voters finds voice in accusations of their inability to see beyond a "few steps 
" to see the possibility of a Conservative led dive into market liberalisation post-Brexit. References to 
"delusions" and "bleak inevitability (d’Ancona, 2016)" being bought to mind during one journalist’s 
attendance of an opening of an opera could caricature the broad feeling of misunderstanding 
between what was characterised by the leave campaign as an out of touch liberal-elite, and a 'real' 
Britain. This misunderstanding and heated debate seems particularly keen on the issue of 
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sovereignty, perhaps due to the real technicalities of the legal aspects of this issue. Unlike economic 
arguments which have advocates for and against versed in finance, and journalists whose sole task it 
is to report on these matters, the intricacies of constitutional and international law are a knowledge 
base that very few possess an intimate knowledge of. The clarion call of sovereignty can seem 
ephemeral yet oddly powerful to some, whilst others are aware of a creeping inevitability of the 
diminution of the role of the nation state on a global stage, or of the depoliticization of certain areas 
of public life as discussed in this paper’s ‘Depoliticization of Economics’ section. Disparagements 
between leave and remain on this topic in particular speak to this. Similar arguments are used with 
regards to jobs, warning "of the risks to jobs and workers' rights of a "Tory Brexit (Guardian, Stewart 
& Asthana, 2016)" 
In the Daily Mail there is a significant focus on the issues of sovereignty which was largely absent 
from the coverage by the Telegraph and the Guardian. Calls for a" once-in-a-generation chance to 
decide how your money is spent (Slack, Grove & Doyle, 2016)", or of  a" real choice now [between] 
sovereignty or super state (Groves, 2016)" reflect an enthusiasm and desperation that the vote to 
leave be seized that is not reflected in the remain campaign. For remain, the campaign is to protect 
what currently exists, it is a risk management exercise and as such has no technocratic rallying cry. 
Leave, bolstered by the braggadocio of the Tabloid press can paint a vote to leave as an exercise in 
democracy and as a heroic "once-in-a-lifetime chance (Slack & Groves, 2016)" Pro-remain coverage 
in the Daily Mail does not attempt to engage in a mirror to this populist heroic vision. Instead there 
is a cunning to the arguments to remain largely centred around being better able to control an 
emergent "German Empire (Hastings, 2016)" from within the European Union, "than as important 
neighbours." Euro-scepticism seeps into every argument for or against the European Union to 
effectively cement the image that the paper would like to portray of plucky little England against the 
European super state. This argument is made possible through inadmission of uncertainty that seeps 
through the Broadsheet's coverage of the referendum. Despite being "blitzed by apocalyptic 
predictions" from banks, politicians, "economists and Establishment figure (Daily Mail, 2016)" - any 
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counter-evidence is seized upon as complete proof of the correctness of the paper's position. James 
Dyson and Lord Bamford and the academic David Blake are quoted repeatedly and painted with 
shades of a David to the Goliath dominant discourse of risk. Quotes from these three are often 
posited against opinions from experts outside of the UK. In this way, journalists are able to frame the 
debate as a nationalist issue as well as a technocratic management of the perception of risk. 
Participants of the discourse are framed outside of patriotic sentiment. Couple this with the reversal 
of risks into opportunities and it is clear to see how the perception of risk becomes of such import 
within the coverage of the referendum. Bamford's declaration that he is "very confident we can 
stand on our own two feet" reflects this desire not to kowtow perfectly.  
Similar themes are explored in The Telegraph. David Cameron is noted as being booed for pleading 
voters not to “take the little England option” (Raner, et.al, 2016). The expert versus lay debate is 
posited in this article through a juxtaposition of Cameron who sees broad consensus by experts on 
the damage leaving the EU will do, versus little Englander Farage, who says that these are the same 
experts who said Britain ‘should join the Euro and the Exchange Rate Mechanism.’ Once again these 
are risks bought from outside the national context. Cameron is put forward as being beholden to 
external influences, whilst Farage is positioned as free to express his own opinions outside of the 
discourse, and to once again attempt to derail the management of perceptions of risk from experts 
within the discourse. The coverage from The Sun and Daily Mirror differs somewhat. In The Mirror, 
all analysis of risks to sovereignty emerge from an article that takes each major theme of the debate 
and lays out an unbiased argument for and against either side of the debate (Daily Mirror, 2016). 
The article ends with 5 readers reacting to this summary with each leave voter sighting sovereignty 
as there key reason to vote leave over the potential damage to the economy. The Sun’s only 
contribution on the matter comes in the form of an article in its Northern Irish edition detailing what 
might happen with regards to a vote to leave (Bannon, A., 2016). The fact that this article does not 
appear in the English edition of the paper is more evidence of the tabloid’s ability to produce 
content for its readership. On the issue of sovereignty, the national focus of many of the newspapers 
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in this study becomes quite clear. The tension between a national readership, and international 
issues is not often explored through the lens of how one countries action has global consequences, 
but rather explored by how global action have consequences upon one nation. In this respect, 
journalists position as managers of the perception of risk has the potential to make endogenous risk 





Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 6 0 
Telegraph 0 0 
The Sun 0 0 
The Mail 0 1 
The Mirror 3 0 
 
Table 13: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Jobs Pre-referendum 
Regulations 
Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 1 1 
Telegraph 0 1 
The Sun 0 0 
The Mail 0 0 
The Mirror 0 0 
 
Table 14: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Regulations Pre-referendum 
 
As we can see in the tables above, discussion about the risks and opportunities to jobs, and to 
regulations do not feature as prominently in this analysis. Much of this could be because these 
categories can be subsumed by the larger topic of the economy or the fact that talk of regulations at 
least can be quite dry and technocratic. The Mirror does make some commentary on the risks to 
jobs that may arise from Brexit with an article concerning speeches made by Jeremy Corbyn, Gordon 
Brown and a statement by the leaders of 12 major trade Unions which is printed in full (Blanchard, J., 
Glaze, B., 2016). The paper’s position as Tabloid and Labour-backing means that the more tangible 
understanding of economic issues as issues of employment is well suited to the readership of the 
paper. Framing risks at this level makes the more personable and less abstract, whilst also avoiding 
much of the expert language of economics. Another article highlights the prevalence of risk language 
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in the remain camp at least by pointing out that David Cameron ‘used the word “risk” 18 times in a 
20-minute TV interview’, to which the PM responded, “It is actually my job to talk about these risks 
and it would be very irresponsible not to” (Daily Mirror, 2016) 
Migration 
Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 11 0 
Telegraph 1 0 
The Sun 1 1 
The Mail 2 2 
The Mirror 1 0 
 
Table 15: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Migration Pre-referendum 
 
At this late stage of the referendum campaign the talk of the remain camp was turning to their 
inability to engage with the leave camps trump card - namely immigration.  The Guardian reports 
that "Ed Balls warned that remain cannot afford to be seen as the party of the status quo on 
migration, or risk losing key swing Labour voters in the referendum (Elgot & Clark, 2016)" was 
reported multiple times, but very few alternative answers to this issue were mooted by politicians or 
journalists. In fact, all of the immigration risks that have been identified in the table refer to either 
the remain camps inability to engage on this front, the image of Britain as "moderate and tolerant 
(Toynbee, 2016)", or how the issue of immigration will place the European project into jeopardy 
should the UK leave. There is no engagement whatsoever with regards to the risks that have been 
identified in other papers. This could stem from the relative insulation journalists have from the 
effects of migration in terms of job competition or wage devaluation. In the context of their 
professions centralisation to the inner cities however this not the case. Those in cities are more likely 
to work with and live with immigrants, and a large part of immigration - especially non-EU migration 
which the government has direct control over, is in white collar professions.  
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The Daily Mail also notes that the remain campaign is unable to engage on the issue of migration, 
reporting that ‘Immigration is the issue that explains why a third or more of Labour voters might 
back Brexit’ (Groves, J., 2016). Another article by Groves reports on William Hague calling votes 
worried about immigration ‘parochial’ (Groves, J., 2016). Groves frames this as a slight to leave 
voters, when Hague is actually referring to the need for international co-operation for the challenges 
of the next twenty to thirty years. This is a great example of how expert and lay can become 
estranged from one another through the discourse of risk, and how risk perception can be managed. 
This disparaging nature of Hague’s remark calls into question non-expert’s intelligence, whilst also 
belittling problems that they may perceive on their own doorstep, within their own country. In the 
context of immigration, and how the remain campaign was seemingly unable to engage on this 
topic, Grove’s techniques here create a sense of unawareness from experts on the risks of 
immigration and this call into question expert opinion. Some attempts were made by the remain 
camp to create a position on immigration using similar techniques to the leave camp in issues such 
as economics. In the earlier article Groves reports that Jeremy Corbyn ‘held to his view that free 





The analysis of post-referendum articles tells a very different story. Regulations seems to drop out of 
the agenda altogether as the weight of more significant short-term decisions comes to bear and the 
language of economics, which was responsible for so much of the risk discourse in the pre-
referendum media, shifts to afford a much more balanced view of the opportunities and risks facing 
the UK economy. This could be attributed to many factors: preference given to pro-leave 
campaigners in the aftermath of the election, financial analysts attempting to shore up market 
confidence, commentators noting the absence of contrary opinions in the UK press in the pre-




Jun 24 - Jul 1 Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian Business/Economics 23 23 
UK Sovereignty 5 9 
Jobs 1 2 
Regulations 0 0 
Migration 6 Total: 35 4 Total: 38 
Telegraph Business/Economics 19 23 
UK Sovereignty 2 4 
Jobs 1 0 
Regulations 0 1 
Migration 5 Total: 28 1 Total: 29 
The Sun Business/Economics 0 0 
UK Sovereignty 0 0 
Jobs 0 0 
Regulations 0 0 
Migration 0 Total: 0 0 Total: 0 
The Mail Business/Economics 15 21 
UK Sovereignty 2 4 
Jobs 2 1 
Regulations 0 1 
Migration 1 Total: 20 1 Total: 28 
The Mirror Business/Economics 1 0 
UK Sovereignty 0 0 
Jobs 0 0 
Regulations 0 0 
Migration 0 Total: 1 1 Total: 1 
Table 16: Articles containing risk and opportunity language within the same paragraph as discussion of the 5 topics 
identified post-referendum. 
Launched into uncertainty and faced with a new reality, the broadsheets seem to have decided to 
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stick to the notions of objectivity to make sense of the new situation. Balanced opinions were 
required after the election as a means to highlight the arguments of either sides to the other in a 
divided nation and much of the content in pro-remain and London-centric papers, was focused on 
how their arguments had not reached leave campaigners, and on how their own biases may have 
blinded them to the opinions of the majority of the population. Much of the discourse of risk seems 
to have fallen on deaf ears. Tabloid papers on the other hand have almost entirely abandoned the 
language of risk in their analysis of the referendum and seem to have instead focused much more of 
their attention on domestic politics and the search for a new Conservative party leader.  
 
Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 23 23 
Telegraph 19 23 
The Sun 0 0 
The Mail 15 21 
The Mirror 1 0 
 
Table 17: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Business/Economics Post-referendum 
 
The shift in risk and opportunity balance across the Guardian's coverage of events following the 
Brexit referendum is stark. Before there was an 11-1 weighting in favour of propounding the risks 
associated with a vote to leave. Following the vote, the split is slightly weighted in favour of the 
opportunities that could arise post-Brexit perhaps in an attempt to re-orientate the discourse of risk 
using the applied knowledge of the discourse to turn perceived risks into opportunities as Althaus 
hypothesized. Perhaps more than any other paper in this study, the Guardian had thrown its weight 
behind a vote to remain and more accurately reflected the mindset of a large proportion of 
remainers. As such, much of their coverage has an element of soul searching about it in the week 
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following the referendum. repeated reference is made to Nicholas Barrett's comment: 
" the younger generation has lost the right to live and work in 27 other countries. We will never 
know the full extent of the lost opportunities, friendships, marriages and experiences we will be 
denied. Freedom of movement was taken away by our parents, uncles, and grandparents in a 
parting blow to a generation that was already drowning in the debts of our predecessors (Nuccitelli, 
2016)." 
More than any comment in the build up to the referendum campaign, Barrett manages to succinctly 
capture a semi-mythological imagery for the purpose of the EU, in contradistinction to the Leave 
camps vision of sunlit meadows. It is as if this imagery or leap of imagination was only made possible 
by the loss of this vision. This is the emotive message that the remain camp seemed unable to use 
during the campaign. The stark divides revealed in the demographics following the referendum gave 
rise to a shrill invective as a once solid world-view has been ripped away, and all of the risks 
forewarned about are now going to have to be navigated. "We are slowly waking up to the fact that 
the emperor has no clothes (Lammy, 2016)" writes Labour MP David Lammy in an article 
resplendent with indignation that leave voters appear to not only have voted for Brexit, but for a 
particularly conservative Brexit without questioning his own position as a member of a "political 
class" that people are "angry with." 
The marked shift towards seeking the opportunities that may come from Brexit reflects an 
acceptance of uncertainty being the new norm. In a write-up of some of the latest shows premiering 
at Cannes, Tracey Follows sums this mood up nicely: 
"It all comes back to the notion of uncertainty, something I have written about before. But now that 
Brexit has become a reality, it's a notion we all need to embrace in a very practical way. I have 




In many ways this is an understanding of risk similar to that of Young’s Alaeic games discussed 
earlier. These are games such as the lottery that require no skill but can leave to massive upheaval to 
participants depending on the results (Young, 2010). Although there is a large amount of soul 
searching taking place in The Guardian's coverage, there is also a sense of resolution, particularly 
amongst the business leaders interviewed, that the uncertainties of Brexit need to be viewed as an 
opportunity now, rather than as a risk. Blackpool voters describe the mood as thus - "if we leave it's 
not going to be the end of the world. You've got to take the chance (Pidd, 2016)." In some ways it 
seems as if the practice of risk assessment that has taken place across the referendum campaign 
may well have prepared all sides for any outcome and set the rhythm for how to go about 
competing in the new realities that Brexit has opened up. The market is for "risk takers (Osborne, 
2016)"but could be "potentially lucrative." There is a sense that the vote was a last chance to spin 
the board and create a resettlement of the rules of the aleaic game of life reflected in the surge in 
quotes from ordinary people, rather than spokesman for the various campaigns. In fact, much of the 
Guardian's coverage can be seen to be an example of what Hardy and Maguire called reaction to risk 
in real time, namely: 
"The real-time organizing of risk involves implementing a range of predetermined response 
mechanisms triggered by metrics, thresholds, and heuristics, as well as instituting various forms of 
communication and coordination among those involved in responding to the risk (Hardy & Maguire, 
2015)" 
Within the coverage we see attempts to understand the risk as it occurs through analysis of 
demographics, analysis of stock market indices, attempts to interview people at all levels of the 
decision-making process, not just those of the team involved in the campaigns. It is an attempt to fill 




Hardy and Maguire write that the "disciplining effects of the dominant discourse mean that even 
when new forms of knowledge and new identities are opened up by actor's deviation from what is 
considered to be disciplined behaviour, this resistance can come to subsumed by the dominant 
discourse (Hardy & Maguire, 2016)." Whilst the analysis above focused on the move towards 
covering the opportunities potentially made possible by Brexit, the following quote are all drawn 
from the still substantial volume of risks highlighted by the paper. "Prudent risk management was 
trumped by ideology (Guardian, 2016)" - writes Dana Nucitelli, who along with Amber Rudd 
(Carrington, 2016) makes the point that leaving the EU may make it harder - or less of a priority for a 
newly sovereign Westminster, to make headway on climate initiatives. Mark Carney "avoided the 
word recession (Allen, 2016)" but speaks gravely of the new challenges facing the UK, whilst other 
commentators make a plea for Labour and moderate Conservative's to ensure continued access to 
the European single market (Lawrence, 2016). All of this commentary sticks to the playbook of Real-
time organisation of risk as outlined by Hardy and Maguire and seeks to subsume the result of the 
election into a continuance of the pre-referendum status quo.  
Roy Greenslade of the Guardian, took the time to publish his own analysis of the headline and 
articles employed by the leave press in an article on June 24th claiming that they used "use every 
opportunity to carry anti-EU headlines (Greenslade, 2016)" as a form of continuous "drip" feed to 
influence their audiences. This study has found similar evidence of this drip feed as mentioned 
above, but in the context of the defeat suffered by remain and therefore the Guardian's ideological 
stance, it is interesting to look at their own interpretations of how rival papers created a mirror 
ideological viewpoint. Greenslade points out the repetition of completely fabricated stories across a 
number of papers, specifically highlighting the use of "EU 'diktat'" in quotation marks across leave 
papers for the lack of their being any such diktat at all. He also notes the ramping up of military 
vocabulary in the final days, with the "EU declaring war on drivers", "we fought two world-wars 
against Germany," "Appeasement" featuring in coverage to set up an extremely confrontational final 
few days for the campaign. He also notes the "weaving of the EU and migrant problems" as if the 
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two issues were completely inextricable. This is an example of how dominant discourse refutes 
outside influence by highlighting the outside commentator’s position as external to the facts of the 
debate and preferring to use the emotive language of feelings and cultural history for their 
arguments, rather than participating in the facts that have been arranged through the texts and 
interpretations of the discourse. As a facet of reactive risk management, this can be seen as an 
exercise in apportioning or shifting blame away from those actors within the dominant discourse. 
Despite the correct procedures being undertaken by the risk management agents of economics, 
politics and their journalistic interpreters, the wrong outcome has occurred due to the use of 





Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 23 23 
Telegraph 19 23 
The Sun 0 0 
The Mail 15 21 
The Mirror 1 0 
 
Table 18: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Business/Economics Post-referendum 
 
Due to their heavily business focused reporting, The Telegraph swings from a politically leaning focus 
on the stock-market perils of a leave vote, to a more balanced understanding of the risks and 
opportunities to be made from Brexit. These comments reflect much of the market sentiment at the 
time. Following a stock-market "crumbling (Bradshaw, 2016)" and a retreat to the safe assets such as 
pharmaceuticals, Telegraph commentators are quick to point out, much as Blyth noted, that  '"low 
117 
 
rates", which it said are "institutionally enshrined in monetary policy" and reinforced by bond buying 
programmes' (Cunningham, 2016) will ensure the stability of post-Brexit Britain unless there 
happened to be a broader inability to repay debt fuelled by reduced earnings or a collapse in asset 
prices. Amongst a sea of hyperbole, the business-focused nature of the Telegraph reflects an 
understanding that the fundamentals of the UK economy had not changed enough in the wake of 
the vote to reflect the kind of crisis of confidence evidenced by the Guardian's commentary. It seems 
here, that expert opinion still matters and systematised application of knowledge within the 
discourse of risk is still being applied. Although across all papers the nexus of risk/opportunity 
dialogue revolved around economic commentary, the increased stoking of myth from the remain 
Guardian and leave Daily Mail, perhaps left these papers in positions where since what they were 
espousing was either one or lost, they were forced into more hyperbolic readings of the situation.  
Alongside this level-headed reading of what Brexit meant for the fundamentals of the country, The 
Telegraph also dug in to the statistics of who exactly voted for either side in the referendum, noting 
that: 
" The correlation between a Brexit vote and receipt of these government credits is striking in many 
parts of the country. Boston in Lincolnshire, for example, revealed itself to be the most pro-Leave 
district in Britain last week, with three-quarters of people voting for Brexit. Boston is also one of the 
areas getting the most from the benefits system: nearly a third of its families rely on benefits of 
some kind, according to government data (Samuel, 2016)." 
The title of this article that this quote is taken from ("Too many Leavers were on benefits and had 
too little to lose") speaks to the heart of the problem. Far-from further stirring the stereotypes of 
scroungers and ne'er-do-wells, the commentator, Juliet Samuel, makes the point that one of the key 
aims of any Conservative government should be to move people off of reliance on the state, but that 
since " too many people do not feel that basic middle-class aspirations like owning a house are 
achievable (Samuel, 2016)", many of these voters seem to have taken a chance on the only vote that 
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they could see leading to any meaningful change, regardless of whether this change would 
ultimately benefit them (another example of Young’s Alaeic games). This is mirrored in the Labour 
parties analysis of the referendum results whereby " Senior Labour figures, including Mr Miliband 
and Yvette Cooper, suggested that the scale of support for Leave was fuelled by discontent with the 
way the country was heading on issues like wages, jobs and opportunities for the young, as much as 
by opposition to the EU (Riley-Smith, 2016)." From a macro point of the view then, The Telegraphs 
economic analysis is one of signalling ports in the storm and reiterating calls for calm heads, rather 
than the vitriolic 'huzzahs' of the pro-leave press, or the lamentations for lost identity of the remain 
press. 
The Daily Mail's post-referendum coverage emerges blinking on to the sunlit meadows of post-Brexit 
opportunity. Numerically at least, there appears to be a more balanced approach to the 
commentary but, much as the Guardian's commentary focused on the risks of opportunities, The 
Mail spins comment on potential risk, into risks to the opportunities that could be gained from 
Brexit. Calls for caution are buffeted away with the very terminology of the market - "UNCERTAINTY 
is the enemy of financial markets and the economy (Daily Mail, 2016)." There are opportunities to be 
seized here, and those that suggest that these new opportunities are not of equal worth to the 
status-quo lost, are presented as fixated upon protection of their own wealth and positions of 
power.  
Interestingly, The Sun and The Mirror – being the two out and out tabloids in this study, almost 
totally refrained from participating in risk/opportunity analysis in the aftermath of the referendum. 
These two papers had participated less in the discourse of risk management in the build up to the 
referendum so similar arguments as to the nature of their readership and the overall less detailed 
analysis of issues affecting them can be employed to explain this absence post-referendum. For The 
Sun, the 24th June was a great day explained as voters taking to the polling booths with “… a howl of 
rage at the increasing hopelessness of their lives, their neglected communities and the gulf between 
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them and the rich, powerful governing class which this Referendum has so starkly exposed.” This 
kind of statement accurately reflects the greater concern with internal domestic politics within the 
tabloid press. Comment on economic statistics reveals a revilement of their potentially misleading 
character. Indeed, the same article claims that “George Osbourne has been blinded by rosy job and 
GDP statistics” which “tell you nothing about real life.” This evidences a call for a re-establishment of 
the power of the political class upon domestic politics and a reversal of the perceived increasing 
technocracy of modern political life where as Ulrich Beck noted, the political class can often pass 
their own failings off as a result of the difficulties of a wider political or economic system outside of 
their control. The Daily Mirror’s front-page bears witness to a rather apathetic title, simply stating 
‘We’re Out’. A matter of fact statement, limply acquiescing to a decision that it did not support. 
UK Sovereignty 
 
Publication Risk Opportunity 
Guardian 5 9 
Telegraph 2 4 
The Sun 0 0 
The Mail 2 4 
The Mirror 0 0 
 
Table 19: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning UK Sovereignty Post-referendum 
 
When The Telegraph does move into analysis of identity it once again portrays a balanced view, 
noting how this vote seems to have thrown into stark relief a real division across the UK. "There is a 
tangible sense that some of those who were on the losing side in the EU referendum are almost 
willing a calamity in order to damn those who voted for Brexit. This could be seen as the effect of 
risk discourse being called into question, whereby the only proof that these identified risks were 
correctly categorised as such is in their coming to pass. The outcome exposed a deep fissure running 
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through British society that now risks being widened by the manner of the response (Telegraph, 
2016)" writes one commentator of the histrionics of the remain press. whilst another notes that 
"Throughout his campaign for Brexit Mr Johnson had promised, with boisterous Èlan, that on voting 
Leave, Britain would emerge blinking into "sunlit meadows"' and that now 'he must be seen to have 
been right (Deacon, 2016)." Note that the second of these quotes appears in the Scottish Edition of 
the Daily Telegraph which, although still pro-Conservative, subscribes to much of the same 
scepticism surrounding the leave campaign as much of Scotland. In the first comment we see a 
stirring of the idea that would so virulently come to the fore with the Daily Mail's "Enemies of the 
People (Slack, 2016)" headline. Because of the attack on national identity dealt to remainers, and the 
reinforcement of identity in leavers, mere disagreement has transformed into something more 
accurately labelled as idiocy versus saboteurs. What is meant by this is that the remain side often 
frames leavers as imbeciles unable to see the consequences of their decisions rather than simply 
those who see a different way, whilst leave commentators pick up on this sense of looking down 
upon them and change every disagreement into an affront to their intelligence or understanding. 
We see this acknowledged somewhat in the above quote concerning Johnson whereby his conjuring 
forth of an illusion of idyllic British identity, now needs to be seen to be right even in the face of 
mounting evidence that this decision, if it was not wrong, has demonstrated large divisions in British 
society. 
The Daily Mail reports that "The post-Brexit government has a huge opportunity to lead all European 
peoples to a better future than the declining, undemocratic, unloved EU. Already some European 
leaders are demanding a referendum in their own countries. We have everything to gain from 
presenting an agenda for a better Europe (Daily Mail, 2016)" 
It seems that it is once again this sceptered isle's destiny to lead Europe out of a mire, presenting 
positivism and progressivism, over isolationism and retreat. There is however an understanding of 
the dangers that could become apparent over the course of the Brexit negotiations - especially in 
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light of the troubles caused within the Labour and Conservative Parties during this election. Very 
quickly, the editorial line form the Daily Mail came out in favour of Mrs May, perhaps reflective of 
Paul Dacre's general disdain for the 'chumocracy' of Cameron's Conservatives (Hodges, D. 2013), and 
once more evocative of the Mythos of Thatcher's Iron Lady. It could be argued that it was because of 
the Mail's position as pro-leave that this sense of forward thinking is more forthcoming than the 
laments of the Guardian, or the straight-forward safe-harbour seeking practical advice of the 
Telegraph.  
"For the sake of a Conservative Party that is at risk of imploding and a normally tolerant Britain that 
is currently so divided, this paper believes MPs and the nation should unite behind Mrs May as 
quickly as possible. The need for a new era of cleaner, more honest, gimmick-free politics has never 
been greater (Daily Mail, 2016)." 
The sheer weight of public opinion that the Daily Mail can help mobilise has been cited as one of the 
main reasons for the remain campaigns failure to win over more supports. Craig Oliver, the Better In 
Campaign manager during the referendum, noted that unlike previous election campaigns, where 
the conservative party could always rely on the weight of national papers support, the referendum 
campaign did not offer similar avenues of communication as the majority of national newspapers 
were pro-leave (Oliver, 2016). Instead, the remain campaign was often forced to rely upon the 
impartial reporting of the BBC, yet this very impartiality left it uncritically repeating much of the 
coverage of the leave supporting papers in order to provide a counterweight to the wealth of expert 
opinion provided by remain. This coupled with the huge editorial oversight placed upon flagship BBC 
news programmes such as Today and the 6 O'clock news, and very little oversight placed upon the 
many smaller news bulletins that the BBC puts out across its TV and radio channels, led to an 
incoherency of message across these outlets which stands in distinction to the very on track 
messages provided by most vociferously pro-remain and pro-leave papers. Oliver cites this as one of 
the key reasons why despite the wealth of pre-remain evidence and opinion that the campaign could 
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muster, the remain message of financial stability could not hold up to the mythos making of pro-





Jobs, Regulations and Migration 
PUBLICATION RISK OPPORTUNITY 
GUARDIAN 1 2 
TELEGRAPH 1 0 
THE SUN 0 0 
THE MAIL 2 1 
THE MIRROR 0 0 
 
Table 20: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Jobs Post-referendum 
 
PUBLICATION RISK OPPORTUNITY 
GUARDIAN 0 0 
TELEGRAPH 0 1 
THE SUN 0 0 
THE MAIL 0 1 
THE MIRROR 0 0 
 
Table 21: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Regulations Post-referendum 
 
Migration 
PUBLICATION RISK OPPORTUNITY 
GUARDIAN 6 4 
TELEGRAPH 5 1 
THE SUN 0 0 
THE MAIL 1 1 
THE MIRROR 0 1 
 
Table 22: Prevalence of risk/opportunity articles concerning Migration Post-referendum 
 
As we saw with the pre-referendum analysis, there is little engagement from papers on the subjects 
of jobs or regulations. We see more engagement from Tabloids on the subject of Jobs due to the 
subject’s greater relevance to their readers. There is also less engagement on the subject of 
immigration post-referendum. Much of the Guardian’s commentary focuses on the risk of the 
remain campaign in not engaging with this issue during the campaign (Stewart, H. Anushka, A. 2016). 
The Telegraph focuses on Cameron’s final meeting with European leaders wherein he said that he 
‘lost the referendum last week in large part because voters did not feel that their concerns 
over immigration had been addressed’ (Dominiczak, P. 2016). Both broadsheets reflect the inability 
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of the remain campaign to effectively engage in this issue. The Daily Mail focuses on Sarah Vine’s 
comments to her husband Michael Gove on taking assurances from Boris Johnson on specific 
immigration controls before pledging his support to him (Pierce, A. 2016). All papers are not really 
engaging on the subject of immigration beyond its absence from the remain campaign, and what it 
means for the upcoming leadership contest. In the pre-referendum results, the discourse of risk was 
used to identify the risks and opportunities stemming from immigration, and unlike economic 
circumstances post-referendum, there had not been any tangible change in the facts of immigration 
policy post-referendum. Couple this with the more emotive language used in talk of immigration 
during the campaign and using Hardy and Maguires model for organising risk, it seems that the 
commentary on immigration falls into the category of reactive risk-management wherein risk is 
shifted, spread and reduced. This type of risk-management organisation makes sense in the post-
referendum context as an identified risk has come to pass which now requires the application of 






To summarise the findings of this analysis, let us return to the key research questions of this paper. 
1)How does the Brexit debate provide an example of how risk discourse creates a divide between 
expert and lay?  
From the analysis of prevalence of risk discourse amongst papers with differing readerships, it is 
clear to see that the language of risk was not as prevalent in Tabloid newspapers. If we think of risk 
discourse as a professionalised and codified means for identifying, framing and managing 
consequences of the endogenous risks that are inherent in global capitalism then the impacts of this 
are twofold. Firstly, tabloid papers, aimed at a C2DE readership, do not report on the language and 
thinking of experts to the same extent as broadsheet papers aimed at an ABC1 demographic. This 
creates a divide in the very language and epistemological outlook between the two readerships. Risk 
language implies an understanding of causation as one cannot identify risk without understanding 
the causes of risk, and also, in quantifying the impact of mitigating the influence of the cause of risk 
which may have just as much impact upon events as the potential risk itself. If risk language is not 
present in commentary of complex ideas such as the United Kingdoms relationship to the European 
Union, then there is a danger that risks are over-simplified, indeed that they can be labelled as 
exogenous, rather than endogenous to the system. Conversely however, it could equally be argued 
that dry technocratic understanding of risk may actually obscure greater hardships. During a debate 
about the economic effects of Brexit, one heckler, when told that GDP was rising called our “Not my 
GDP”  (Chakrabortty, 2016). The language of risk tends towards an understanding of averages, or of 
avoiding fat-tail risks, but in doing so, can misunderstand the experience of those towards the 
bottom of the distribution.  
Although there was a clear divide between Tabloid and Broadsheet papers, it would of course be a 
mistake to assume that those who utilised the language of risk, understood the consequences of 
Brexit as such. For a great many, the potential rewards of leaving the European union are potentially 
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huge. We saw in papers such as The Telegraph and the Daily Mail an attempt to engage with the 
discourse of risk often through the use of reframing risks as opportunities. In this way journalists and 
commentators were able to subvert the projections of the remain camp from within the discourse 
itself, lending the weight of the discourse to their own assessments of risk. In the tabloid papers 
within this study there was far less engagement in this same language. This may explain why 
subjects such as immigration, which featured heavily in the final weeks of the Brexit campaign, did 
not feature so prevalently in the articles analysed in this study.  
Whilst the discourse of risk can be applied easily to subjects on which there is data to analyse, more 
emotive subjects such as immigration of sovereignty are identified in risks but often in terms of their 
economic impact, rather than on what their impact may be with regards to identity or nationalism. It 
could also be argued of course that the impact of these subjects may simply be of far less import to 
those situated within professionalised, educated and often cosmopolitan positions, than their more 
rural, blue-collar countryman. As we saw from the analysis of participants in the discourse, all papers 
tended to report quotes from MPs, members of the business community, or other traditional 
mouthpieces of British society. This is of course a facet of journalism as a profession. Weight and 
time is given to those whose opinions are newsworthy and who are deemed to hold a place of 
importance within the discourse of journalism as a profession. These participants within the 
discourse, did not tend to engage with issues such as immigration – or at least not via the language 
of risk in the way that economic issues were discussed. This could be because of the thorniness of 
the issue, the distance of these actors for issues concerning immigration, or the fact the immigration 
from the European union was one side of the debate where numbers were not easily in their favour.  
Economic success could easily be portrayed as endogenous to the European Union project, but 
issues such as how the PIIG countries, and how Britain had lost control of its borders were also 
endogenous the system. These issues were not tackled using the language of risk. They instead 
became fertile ground for emotive language in the campaign. Language that is easily understood and 
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remembered on the campaign trail. If the same subjects are not being spoken about by different 
sides then there will be a disconnect between expert and lay. Journalists of course, played their part 
in this by aiming their content at their readerships and writing it in styles that appeal to them. 
Curran’s ideal liberal model fits nicely on to the UKs broadsheet dailies where newsworthiness and 
explanation of topics is often put above entertainment (although this paper did unearth biases in 
each paper often dependent on readership and therefore market pressures). For the UKs tabloid 
papers though, these rules are not applied as dwindling circulations increase the pressure for 
sensationalised news. Dry technocratic analysis of issues falls behind in the face of competing 
pressures. In terms of discourses that affected the newspaper output of the election then, it may 
well have proven equally as fruitful to compare the differences in professional discourses between 
Tabloid and Broadsheet journalists and how this effects the relationship between expert and lay. 
 
2)How does risk discourse alienate certain players and how is this demonstrated within newspaper 
reporting of the Brexit referendum?  
After the referendum this paper found evidence of what hardy and Maguire called the 
reorganisation of risk. That is the rapid movements of the discourse of risk to understand risk in new 
ways, once an identified risk has come to pass. Very quickly we saw newspapers from the remain 
side move to recategorize previously identified risks as opportunities. This is evidence of alienation 
caused by the discourse of risk in two areas. For the remain side, the attempts to categorise remain 
in terms of risks to the economy had clearly not had the impact upon those outside of the discourse 
as it had had on them. This calls into question the power-structure of the discourse as well as its 
assumed knowledge base. We see great evidence of this from The Guardian’s soul-searching 
journalism post-referendum, particularly on the lamentations of the remain camps inability to 
engage on issues such as immigration. On the other side of the debate, pre-referendum leave 
coverage often called into question the experts utilising risk discourse to make their point. Whilst 
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some leave campaigners attempted to participate in the discourse the lack of expert backing 
severely hampered their ability to do so. Instead what we saw was an attempt to question the 
power structures and assumed knowledge of the discourse which points to feelings of alienation 
from those outside. 
Journalism’s position within the discourse as managers of risk perception seems obvious here. They 
want to inform and guide their readership but also need to reflect their values in order to appeal to 
them commercially. For remain papers we see this in their attempts at reorganisation of risk post-
referendum. With the power structures of the discourse challenged, attempts must be made at 
interrogating mistakes or in identifying risks not perceived by the discourse. Whilst there is evidence 
of reorganisation of risk, we also see a continued faith in the initial categorisations being correct. 
Within tabloids we do not see the same level of risk perception management within this study. It is 
quite possible however that this was not because of its absence, but rather because of tabloid 
papers avoidance of the dry technocratic language of risk and their greater need to put out 
entertaining content over broadsheet papers. Within the leave papers, we see more risks analysed 
pre-referendum, but this is mostly because the vast majority of public figures were on the side of 
remain. In the Daily Mail these quotes are often questioned by the papers own commentary and 
juxtaposed by the limited number of experts on the leave side of the campaign. In short, risk 
perception was managed through a greater questioning of the discourse, rather than though 
countervailing facts or evidence. This of course neatly played into the anti-establishment air that the 
leave camp was able to cultivate. 
 
3)How does the UK newspaper industry represent the tension between sovereign state and 




Of our key research questions, this proved the hardest to find evidence for. On the discussion of 
sovereignty pre-referendum, we found evidence of endogenous risks being perceived as exogenous, 
or rather problems that are being felt across countries, rather being impinged upon Britain from 
without. Many have seen the referendum result as a result of frustrations with domestic policy, 
rather than as a genuine frustration against the European Union, and in this respect, we can 
interrogate the position of journalists as focused upon producing content for their audiences, and 
therefore domestically focused. It is perhaps easier to explain an issue as arising from either within 
domestic politics, or from an outside force such as the EU, than it is to explain risks as endogenous to 
globalisation and market capitalism. The Telegraph with its heavy focus on economic commentary 
and market movements was perhaps the only paper in the study to show evidence of perceiving risk 
as endogenous, whilst there was evidence of the other papers viewing risk in a more simplistic 
fashion. 
We also saw greater use of risk discourse, which is itself a professionalised and therefore 
internationalists discourse, amongst broadsheet papers. Their readerships reflect more 
professionalised people, who are used to working in an international marketplace and who have 
higher purchasing power. Understanding the causes of risk, creates an understanding that most risk 
in complex systems is endogenous, rather than endogenous. To those who read and are immersed in 
the professional discourse of risk more often, it may be hypothesized that endogenous risks could be 
better dealt with co-operatively rather than in isolation, as one might when ejecting the cause of an 
exogenous risk. Couple this with the fact that the beneficiaries of globalisation (often the 
readerships of broadsheet papers) attract a higher yield of advertiser for the papers, and you gain a 
level of professionalism amongst Broadsheet journalists that can be maintained free from 
sensationalism, and committed to understanding issues in their complexity.  
All papers maintained a sharp focus on the domestic consequences of such a vote, as is to be 
expected of national papers. The outliers in this were the Telegraph that reported on international 
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money market movements, and The Guardian, which often reported on the human impact on EU 
citizens living within the UK alongside reportage on positive experiences membership of the EU 
afforded to their reporters and commentators. Although it was a domestic vote, many of the issues 
being discussed, such as immigration, economics and national identity are not wholly the purview of 
Britain as an isolated nation-state any longer. Decisions taken by us and our European partners 
effect the whole of us. Even in the reporting of papers immersed in risk discourse, the vast majority 
of risks identified were risks that could affect the UK, rather than other parts of the interconnected 
system. German cars would be more expensive for us Brits, but little mention of how this may affect 
Germany (except in a slightly punitive sense) was made. Nissan parts would more difficult to make in 
Britain if there were tariffs, yet the other Nissan supply lines of Europe were not considered in great 
depth. We have here then a dichotomy between a broadsheet press who utilise risk discourse which 
is a tool of international professionals, to understand complex international issues, but then tend to 
focus on the ways that this may affect their domestic markets. On the other hand, we have a Tabloid 
press readily willing to label the endogenous exogenous and sensationalise difficult issues into one 
of emotionally resonant fallacy. It seems in both instances it may well be market pressures impacting 
upon these decisions. Although journalism as a profession seems to operate in Beck’s theoretical 
space of managers of the perception of risk, it seems that, in the case of the UK press at least, 
market pressures may well be of equal importance to the professions position in the discourse of 
risk when it comes to the way in which risk is framed in the Brexit debate.  
 
Points to consider 
The focus on risk/opportunity language has perhaps taken away from a more nuanced 
understanding of the language employed by the newspapers and commentators who did not choose 
to engage in this type of language during the referendum. Issues of identity, immigration, and 
sovereignty which are often matters of the heart, rather than the head can often interesting avenues 
in which to explore the Brexit debate within the papers at this time. It could shed more light on to 
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why the leave campaign won and how journalists were able to engage with those outside of the risk 
discourse. If this project were to be pushed further it would be interesting to analyse the 
mythologizing undertaken by either side and how this sense of identity impacted upon the campaign 
and upon newspaper coverage, rather than how statistical analysis was used to bolster one set of 
viewpoints and belittle another. Conversely, it may be interesting to consider how identities could 
be used to obfuscate the importance of risk/opportunity analysis and how national identity, rather 
than global market participant, impacted upon the weight of factual evidence, and how the position 
of expert within this technocratic dominant discourse was undermined by an unwillingness to 
engage in these equally important factors of political life. This would require a more thorough 
reading both sides to measure the impact one had amongst the other, and to consider the impact 
that the language chosen, and the sources chosen, by journalists within UK newspapers over this 
period impacted upon the referendum. Nevertheless, the impact of risk discourse within a global 
society is a fruitful manner in which to interrogate the position of journalist as key in managing the 
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